

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME LIV

APRIL, 1961

NUMBER 2

THE HYPERBOREAN MAIDENS ON DELOS *

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WITHIN the sanctuary of Artemis, on a small plain just east of the Sacred Harbor of Delos, lies a tomb dating from Minoan times which remained holy throughout most of antiquity.¹ Modern investigators call it the *sema* of the Hyperborean Maidens, identifying it with a tomb which Herodotus says is "on your left as you enter the Artemisium" (4.34). Here, he was told, lay the remains of two maidens, Hyperoche and Laodice, who had once brought a tribute to the goddess Eileithyia from the Hyperboreans and had died on the island; here, in their honor, the boys and girls of Delos placed locks of their own hair. Callimachus, writing around 270, seems to know of this tomb; he does not mention it, but he says that the Delian girls offer their hair to the daughters of Boreas, Upis, Hecaerge, and Loxo, who once brought a tribute from the Arimaspians. The boys now give "the first-fruits of their beards" to honor some men who escorted the "Arimaspian" maidens to Delos (Hymn 4.278 ff.). And Pausanias says that the Delian maidens used to cut their hair in honor of Hecaerge and Opis (1.43.4).

Behind the Artemisium, says Herodotus, there was another tomb, a *theke* which is apparently identical with a Minoan tomb in the sanctuary of Apollo not far from the temple of Artemis. In it lay Opis and Arge, maidens who had come from the Hyperboreans even earlier than Hyperoche and Laodice, "together with

* This article has been greatly helped by the criticisms of my colleague, Professor Saul Levin, and Professor Arthur D. Nock.

¹ The archaeological evidence concerning the tombs of the Hyperborean maidens has been most recently discussed by Charlotte Long, "Greeks, Carians, and the purification of Delos," *American Journal of Archaeology* 62 (1958), 297 ff. and by Hubert Gallet de Santerre, *Delos, Primitive et Archaique* (Paris, 1958).

the gods themselves." For them, the women of Delos made collections and sang a hymn composed by Olen the Lycian (4.35). No other ancient author refers to such collections or to the *theke*, and we nowhere learn what it was the women collected; but Callimachus says that the women of the Delian chorus beat with their feet an accompaniment to the men who sing the *nomos* which "Olen the Lycian brought from Xanthos" (Hymn 4.304 ff.). This *nomos* was identified with the hymn to Opis and Arge by Wilamowitz, who also showed that it was familiar to the composer of the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo.²

Even this cursory glance at the evidence reveals that though the rituals — the hymn-singing and the hair-offering — tend to remain constant, the identity of the persons honored differs from source to source, and Opis is now in the *theke*, now in the *sema*. Most students of the problem have therefore said that there was in reality one cult of the Hyperborean Maidens, honored in several ways and given various names, and that in Herodotus, where two pairs of maidens are distinguished, Hyperoche and Laodice are merely doublets of Arge and Opis. My own view is quite different: when Herodotus wrote, there were two distinct cults (whose myths may well have influenced each other); Hyperoche and Laodice were associated with Eileithyia, Arge and Opis with Artemis; later, Eileithyia declined in importance and was largely absorbed by Artemis; Artemis probably took over the ritual of Opis and Arge, who in turn became the occupants of the *sema* and recipients of the hair-offerings, while Hyperoche and Laodice disappeared with the decline of Eileithyia. In discussing the evidence in detail I shall therefore argue that we possess testimony for a complicated process of religious change which occurred side by side with and almost in spite of a conservatism in ritual.

Herodotus wrote his account of the Delian cults in order to set forth the evidence for the reality of the Hyperboreans, about which he shows considerable skepticism. The Scythians, who would have been the Hyperboreans' near neighbors, could tell him nothing about them (4.32); the Delians, whose account

² Die Ilias und Homer (Berlin, 1916) 451. He was partly anticipated by O. Crusius in Roscher's Lexikon der Griechischen und Romischen Mythologie, s.v. Hyperboreer.

makes up most of 4.33-5, had the most to say. Their story, given in indirect discourse, assumes that there really were Hyperboreans; into this narrative Herodotus interjects statements in direct discourse, apparently drawn from his own observation and reading, which confirm portions of it, though by no means all.³ They force the reader to consider seriously whether the Hyperboreans exist, and permit him to conclude that the evidence is insufficient; Herodotus can offer at the end what W. K. C. Guthrie calls a "somewhat contemptuous dismissal of the whole business";⁴ if there are Hyperboreans, there are also Hypernotians beyond the south wind (4.36). But however contemptuous the dismissal, nothing suggests that Herodotus' presentation of the evidence — of Delian cult and tradition and of his own observations — was hasty and inaccurate.

Sacred objects bound in wheaten straw, said the Delians, are passed along from community to community from the Hyperboreans to the Adriatic, south to Dodona and east to Delos. At first they were carried all the way by the Hyperborean maidens Hyperoche and Laodice, escorted by five men "now called Perpherees"; but the Hyperboreans, since their messengers never returned, now carry the objects only to their own borders. The girls died on the island, and (here Herodotus employs direct discourse) the youths and maids of Delos cut their hair for them:

The girls before marriage cut off a lock, wind it about a spindle, and place it on the *sema*. (This *sema* is inside the Artemisium, on the left as you enter, and on it an olive grows). And the young men wind some of their hair about a green shoot and they too place it on the *sema*.⁵

³ In accordance with the principle set forth, among other places, in 2.99: *Αἰγυπτίους ἔρχομαι λόγους ἐρέων κατὰ τὰ ἤκουον. προσέσται δέ τι αὐτοῖσι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς δόξης.*

In 4.11-2, for instance, Herodotus gives in indirect discourse what he considers the most reliable account of the coming of the Scythians, that they replaced the Cimmerians. In direct discourse he adds confirmation from observation — the tomb of the Cimmerian nobles, the Cimmerian walls, etc. — and further speculations on the Cimmerians' departure. These last we reject, but as much of the rest as Herodotus really confirms — that the land was once held by a pre-Scythian race known as "Cimmerians" — we have no reason to doubt (see A. D. Godley, *Herodotus*, Loeb Classical Library rev. ed. (London, 1938), II, p. xv. Ellis H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (Cambridge, England, 1913), 41 ff.).

⁴ *The Greeks and Their Gods* (Boston, 1950) 78, n. 2.

⁵ I have translated the text of Karl Hude, *Oxford Classical Texts*, 3 ed. (Oxford,

Herodotus probably saw the *sema* himself, for Charles Picard, following the directions given here, discovered what is almost certainly this tomb.⁶

The maidens receive this honor from the inhabitants of Delos. But the same men say that also Arge and Opis, Hyperborean maidens, journeyed through the same peoples and arrived at Delos even earlier than Hyperoche and Laodice. Now the latter, they say, arrived bearing the tribute to Eileithyia which they had promised for an easy delivery [sc. of Apollo], but Arge and Opis came together with the gods themselves, and are given different honors by the Delians. For them, the Delians say, the women make gatherings, naming their names in the hymn which Olen the Lycian composed for them (4.35).

Herodotus adds that Olen came from Lycia and composed the other ancient hymns sung on Delos. He returns to indirect discourse to say that ashes from the altar (of Artemis, presumably) are placed on the *theke*, which he then describes in direct discourse, presumably *de visu*. Thus he confirms from observation that there are two tombs on Delos, and from independent knowledge concerning Olen that one of his hymns is likely to have been sung to Opis and Arge. The Delians' good faith is upheld, their reliability questioned only when they touch on mythical history. His use of indirect discourse — due probably to his careful desire to indicate that he was not speaking from observation — has not caused anyone, so far as I know, to doubt the authenticity of the information concerning the collection-ritual or the placing of ashes on the *theke*, though Herodotus is our only source for both. But if we do not doubt that these rituals took place, we have no justification for doubting anything the Delians say about their cults except what they cannot have known, their earliest history.

Yet most modern scholars wish to see the pairs of maidens as doublets of each other. "Herodot," says Nilsson, "hat die Dubletten Arge und Opis, Hyperoche und Laodike."⁷ If so, the Delians, in speaking of their own cults, did not know what they were talk-

1927), and have made use of J. E. Powell's *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge, England, 1938), and his translation (Oxford, 1949).

⁶ Ch. Picard and J. Replat, "Recherches sur la Topographie du Hiéron Délien," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 48 (1924), 251 ff.

⁷ *Griechische Feste* (Leipzig, 1908) — abbreviated Gr. Feste — 207 ff.

ing about: *καί σφι* [Opis and Arge] *τιμὰς ἄλλας δεδóσθαι πρὸς σφέων*. These honors differ not only in nature but in purpose. Opis and Arge are probably agrarian, to judge from the fact that in other cults (including those connected, like that of Opis and Arge, with Artemis) similar collections of gifts perform such a function (Nilsson, Gr. Feste 208). The locks of hair offered Hyperoche and Laodice, on the other hand, are given upon entry into a new phase of sexual life — marriage for the girls, manhood (probably) for the boys — and have no connection with farming.⁸ Furthermore, they do not seem to have been offered during a general festival — at least we do not hear of any — while the collections and hymn-singing to Opis and Arge seem, as we shall see, to have come at a fixed time of year.

The cults differ in extent: Hyperoche and Laodice were worshipped only by the Delians: *αὐται μὲν δὴ ταύτην τιμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τῶν Δήλου οἰκητόρων* says Herodotus at the beginning of 4.35, contrasting it to what he will say about the fairly widespread cult of Opis and Arge: *παρὰ δὲ σφέων* [the Delians] *μαθόντας νησιώτας τε καὶ Ἰωνας ὑμνέειν Ὡπίν τε καὶ Ἀργην ὀνομάζοντάς τε καὶ ἀγείροντας*.

They differ in the identity of the goddess to whom each pair is subordinate. Opis and Arge are connected with the agrarian Artemis, Hyperoche and Laodice with the childbirth-goddess Eileithyia. The origins of these relationships are enough to distinguish the pairs, for while Hyperoche and Laodice had no known existence apart from Eileithyia, Opis was a foreign divinity whom Artemis took over. We infer this from the other form of the name, *Oupis*, which is not a Greek word and which never would have arisen if *Opis* had been original.⁹ Opis eventually became a mythical companion of Artemis and one of her epithets,¹⁰ but in the fifth century she and Arge (whose origin is

⁸ That the boys' offering was a *rite de passage* in Callimachus' time is indicated by his description, *παῖδες δὲ θέρος τὸ πρῶτον ἰούλων . . . ἀπαρχόμενοι φορέουσιν* (4.298). And nothing hinders, at least, our applying his testimony to the fifth century as well.

⁹ Wilamowitz says that the Delian rite well suits "vergötterten *paredroi* der Artemis, die selbst den Namen Opis oder Upis oder übernahm, wie der einzige sicher ungrische Name lautete" (Der Glaube der Hellenen I [Berlin, 1931], — abbreviated GdH—p. 103).

¹⁰ For the companion see, e.g., Virgil, Aeneid XI, 532–533; for the epithet Cicero De Natura Deorum 3.58 and Et. Magn. s.v. Οὐπίς.

obscure) were still to some degree independent, since the gifts are gathered and the hymn sung not to her but to them.

The connection between the maidens Arge and Opis and the goddess Artemis is disputed by no one; that between Hyperoche and Laodice and Eileithyia, which is paradoxical in that they are virgins, she the goddess of childbirth, requires examination. Its precise nature I cannot settle: they may have been intercessors with Eileithyia or even Eileithyiae.¹¹ But that such a connection existed is evident from the myth that they first brought her the Hyperborean tribute, and further penetration of this myth can partly clarify the connection. For it probably presupposes that in the fifth century the Hyperborean tribute was actually presented, after its long journey, to Eileithyia. It is normally assumed that Apollo always received the tribute, as indeed he did later, and this assumption has helped to strengthen the theory that Hyperoche and Laodice are doublets of Opis and Arge: it makes Hyperoche and Laodice appear subordinate to Apollo and therefore related to Artemis. But why then does the fifth-century myth not agree with this? It might be argued that a myth stating that the tribute was given to Eileithyia is compatible with its being given Apollo on his birthday. It seems indeed safest to say that a *Hyperborean* tribute to Eileithyia must have something to do with Apollo's birth, since efforts to disconnect the Hyperboreans from Apollo appear dangerous.¹² But birthday presents are usually

¹¹ Cf. R. Vallois, "Topographie Délienne I," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 48 (1924), 435 ff. He goes on to speculate that the *γερέθλιος* olive of Callimachus (Hymn 4.262), near which Apollo was born, is the one growing on the *sema*, which would obviously further connect Eileithyia with Hyperoche and Laodice. Unfortunately he hypothesizes in addition a post-natal rite honoring the maidens, identifying it with a *rite de morsure* which Callimachus said was performed by sailors (Hymn 4.316 ff.). "Les jeunes mères déposaient-elles une offrande sur le *séma*, mordaient-elles l'olivier sacré, le faisaient-elles toucher à leur bébés, c'est ce que nous ne pouvons deviner maintenant, mais le rite dont nous sommes invités à admettre l'existence devait suivre l'accouchement, et non le précéder." It seems unlikely that the maidens possessed this unattested post-natal rite in addition to the well-attested premarital one.

¹² Charles Picard, in "La Crete et les Legendes Hyperboréennes," *Revue Archéologique*, series 5, vol. 25 (January-June, 1927), 349-360, tried to prove that the original Hyperborean home was Crete, and he is followed by Gallet de Santerre, Delos (note 1). Since Eileithyia is probably originally Cretan, it would suit my theory very neatly were the Hyperborean tribute once hers alone, and were it transferred to Apollo and Central Greece later, with Delphi's coöperation; but Picard's thesis is too conjectural.

given to the persons born, not their mothers' midwives; if the myth is eccentric, it most probably had to yield to the living ritual, that Eileithyia and not Apollo received the tribute.

Another difficulty with the view that Apollo always received the tribute is that it fails to account for the presence of Hyperoche and Laodice in the myth. Apollo's tribute could surely have been brought by the Perpherees (whose name suggests bringing something); the maidens are a useless encumbrance to the story, unless they are there for some other reason. It might be argued that they were Hyperboreans, and their presence on the island needed explaining. But why were the occupants of this ancient grave called Hyperboreans? Again, it might be urged that the hair-offerings, wrapped about a spindle or green shoot, resemble the straw wrappings of the Hyperborean tribute; the myth will have reflected this cult fact by joining together the recipients of each. But why this cult fact? Why the resemblance?

These questions can be answered by the following theory. Eileithyia, closely connected with the occupants of the *sema*, was given the Hyperborean tribute, quite possibly to strengthen Delos' claim to being Apollo's birthplace. Surely, the Delians may have argued, if the Hyperboreans, Apollo's own people, send a tribute to Eileithyia on Delos, they are recognizing her rôle *in his birth on the island*. And the importance attached to Eileithyia's presence at Apollo's birth is reflected not only in the behavior of the Hyperboreans but also in the words of the composer of the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo: the goddesses who congregated on Delos before the birth felt it essential to secure Eileithyia's presence, and promised her an elaborate necklace (vv. 92 ff.). The occupants of the *sema* were accordingly called Hyperboreans and said to have first brought the tribute, and the hair-offerings were made to resemble the tribute they carried.¹³

The differences between the pairs of maidens have been obscured by their obvious mythical similarity: both pairs came from

¹³ When and why the names "Hyperoche" and "Laodice" were given these maidens seems unanswerable. Should it be felt that they belonged to "Hyperborean tradition" (cf. the names of the Hyperborean Heroes Hyperochus and Laodicus, Pausanias 10.23.2), then I would argue that the occupants of the *sema* can easily have got these names only after becoming Hyperboreans.

the Hyperboreans a long time ago. But if we seek out the probable sources for the myths, we can see how artificial even these similarities are. The crucial passage consists of these words, already quoted in translation, from Herodotus 4.35:

Φασὶ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι καὶ τὴν Ἀργὴν τε καὶ τὴν Ὀπιν, εἰούσας παρθένους ἐξ Ὑπερβορέων, κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους ἀνθρώπους πορευομένας ἀπικέσθαι ἐς Δῆλον ἔτι πρότερον Ὑπερόχης τε καὶ Λαοδίκης. ταύτας μὲν νῦν τῇ Εἰλειθυίῃ ἀπὸ φερούσας ἀντὶ τοῦ ὠκυτόκου τὸν ἐτάξαντο φόρον ἀπικέσθαι, τὴν δὲ Ἀργὴν τε καὶ τὴν Ὀπιν ἅμα αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι θεοῖσι ἀπικέσθαι λέγουσι . . .

This passage consists of an inference — that Opis and Arge came first — from two propositions: Hyperoche and Laodice brought the tribute to Eileithyia, and Arge and Opis came together with the gods. But the inference is justifiable only if Eileithyia got the tribute for her help at Apollo's birth, and if ἅμα αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι θεοῖσι can mean "at the birth of Apollo" (and, presumably, Artemis).¹⁴ Now the Greek ought to mean that Opis and Arge *arrived when the gods arrived*, but this meaning the Delians were not anxious to convey, because it suggests that Apollo was born elsewhere and came to Delos. They must, therefore, have been quoting, and misinterpreting, someone else, straining the phrase to make it mean "when the gods were born."

This difficulty has been previously recognized. Macan, for instance, took the phrase "together with the gods" to refer to two other gods, predecessors of Apollo and Artemis.¹⁵ But who? And how do we know that they preceded? The Delians' argument depends entirely upon this point; would they not have identified

¹⁴ Powell, in his *Lexicon* (note 5) understands the phrase to mean "in company with the gods" — rightly, in my opinion. But if it is taken temporally, it has to mean "at the same time as the gods' arrival," not "birth." The rule seems to be this: when ἅμα, used temporally, is followed by a word not denoting a period of time (where the participle is so easily understood as to be superfluous), we are (a) to supply in thought the participle of the verb on which the ἅμα-phrase depends (or, occasionally, the participle of a nearby verb to which the ἅμα-phrase is clearly related?) unless (b) the noun itself is verbal. For example:

a. ἀλλ' οὔτε Αἰγυπτίους δοκέω ἅμα τῷ Δέλτα τῷ ὑπὸ Ἰώνων καλεομένῳ γενέσθαι 2.15.3; similarly 5.58.1, 5.85.2, 7.51.3, 7.73.

b. τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἔθνος ἐὼν Πελασγικὸν ἅμα τῇ μεταβολῇ τῇ ἐς Ἑλλήνας καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν μετέμαθε 1.57.3. Similarly 2.36.1, ἅμα κῆδει, "when in mourning." Clearly neither of these uses permits ἅμα αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι θεοῖσι to mean "together with the birth of the gods."

¹⁵ Reginald W. Macan, ed. *Herodotus* (London, 1895) ad loc.

any predecessors and demonstrated their priority? Much more reasonable is Legrand's emendation, *ἅμα αὐτῇσι τῇσι θεοῖσι* which is to refer to Eileithyia and Leto and is supported by a reference to Pausanias 1.18.5.¹⁶ But neither in this passage of Pausanias nor anywhere else are Eileithyia and Leto said to have come simultaneously; in the Homeric Hymn they obviously do not. Nor were Pausanias' sources for this passage Delian. If Herodotus wrote what Legrand says he wrote I should far rather refer it to the congregation of goddesses on Delos described in the Homeric Hymn.

Another solution is available in the supposition that the Delians are here yoking together two essentially incompatible sources, one of which assumed Apollo's birth on the island while the other said that he came to Delos. The latter, manifestly unalterable since it required of the Delians a forced interpretation, may well have Olen's hymn to Opis and Arge, which, as we shall see, is referred to by and is therefore older than the Homeric Hymn, our oldest source for Apollo's Delian birth. Olen's hymn, which Callimachus says was brought from Xanthos, is quite likely to have said that Apollo was born in Lycia or at least came to Delos from Asia Minor.

The myth of Hyperoche and Laodice cannot have been told in this hymn. Not only are the two stories linked together by a forced interpretation of the phrase *ἅμα αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι θεοῖσι*; not only does the tale of Hyperoche and Laodice imply Apollo's birth on Delos; but Hyperoche and Laodice are closely connected with the Hyperboreans, while Opis and Arge are not. They brought no tribute, and what is worse, they took the tribute road *κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους ἀνθρώπους*, before there was any tribute to bring. Their similarity to Hyperoche and Laodice is imposed upon them and fits badly. Delos thus possessed two strains of myth, Olen's ancient liturgical hymns and stories which developed later as the occasion demanded.¹⁷

Why the Delians imposed this similarity on the maidens — why they made Opis and Arge into Hyperboreans — is difficult to say,

¹⁶ Ph.-E. Legrand, "Herodotea," *Revue des Etudes Anciennes* 40 (1938), 230-231, and adopted in his edition (Paris, 1950). His remarks constitute an excellent presentation of the difficulty.

¹⁷ Opis was apparently made a Hyperborean after Olen's time: Pausanias 5.7.8.

except that it helps to undercut any suggestion that they, or Apollo, came from Lycia. But certainly the Delians had no wish to go further. Modern scholars have grown accustomed to the phrase "Hyperborean Maidens," forgetting that the Delians had no cult of the Hyperborean Maidens comparable to the Cabiri, say, or the Great Goddesses, but always worshipped the girls by individual names; "naming the names," for instance, of Arge and Opis. How can we go farther, and argue from artificial mythical resemblances to cult identity? When a man says that he or his fellows worship two sets of deities in entirely different ways, can he be mistaken?

Modern opinion seems perversely inclined to believe that he can.¹⁸ Charles Picard, for example, speaks of "Vierges porteuses d'offrandes, arrivées en *deux* groupes à Délos."¹⁹ His italics seem intended to emphasize his awareness of the differences between the groups, but to no avail, for Herodotus says that only the second pair brought offerings. "Les deux premières, on le sait, avant la naissance d'Apollon," he continues, "les deux autres au moment de l'illustre Genèse. Après la première *théorie* (celle d'Hyperoché et Laodicé venues les secondes 'avec les dieux') etc." Neither pair came before the birth, and it was Opis and Arge, not Hyperoché and Laodice, who came "avec les dieux"; but the pairs have apparently blended together in his mind. Nilsson says of the maidens collectively: "ihr Grab, auf dem ein Ölbaum wuchs, lag hinter dem Artemision; darauf wurde ihnen ein eigenartiges Opfer gebracht, die Asche von den auf dem Altar, selbstverständlich der Artemis verbrannten Schenkelstücken" (Gr. Feste 207). But according to Herodotus, our sole witness, the grave on which the olive was growing was the *sema* in front of the Artemisium; the ashes were thrown on the *theke* behind it. The two

¹⁸ Exceptions, apart from the editors of Herodotus, include O. Crusius (note 2) and R. Vallois (note 11). The confusion is at least as old as K. O. Müller: "... the Hyperborean priestesses, who brought the rites to Delos, Arge and Opis, according to others Hecaeerge and Loxo" (The Dorians, 2 Eng. ed. [London, 1839], I, 373).

¹⁹ In RA (see note 12). See too his "La route des processions hyperboréennes en Grèce," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 132 (July-December, 1946) 99 ff.: "Pour Hérodote les premières Hyperboréennes avaient été Argé et Opis, venues s'acquitter d'un vœu fait *ἀντὶ τοῦ ὠκυρόκου* (103n.). Gallet de Santerre is content to associate all four maidens, including Arge and Opis, with the birth of Apollo, apparently accepting Picard's notions (Délos — see note 1 — p. 166).

pairs of maidens having coalesced, the two graves do the same. Herodotus is again our only source for the gift-gathering in honor of Opis and Arge. "Dass der Zug agrarisch," says Nilsson, "dem Umhertragen der Eiresione auf Samos ähnlich war, erhellt sich aus der Anknüpfung an die hyperboreischen Garben."²⁰ But no ancient source connects the Hyperborean sheaves with this procession. And again, "noch früher [than Hyperoche and Laodice] sollen zwei andere hyperboreische Jungfrauen, Opis und Arge, nach Delos bekommen sein, welche der Eileithyia Gaben brachten" (Geschichte 548). This error may be borrowed from Wilamowitz, who said that the gifts which the women gathered were actually given not to Opis and Arge but to Eileithyia (GdH 1.103); Wilamowitz was confusing, or else inferring the identity, of these gifts with the Hyperborean tribute, but Opis and Arge have nothing to do with Eileithyia. Finally, "die schwankenden Namen und Zahlen der Hyperboreerinnen erklären sich aus einer willkürlichen Auswahl unter den auf verschiedenen Orten vorhandenen gleichartigen, aber verschieden benannten Gestalten" (Gr. Feste 208). I do not see how the Delians' stress on the prior coming of Opis and Arge, or on the different honors paid, can suggest an arbitrary choice; and from all we have seen the pairs can hardly be called "gleichartig."

But Nilsson has in mind a passage in Callimachus, who says that it was not Hyperoche and Laodice, but Upis, Hecaerge and Loxo who first brought first-fruits from the Arimaspi; no recipient of the tribute is specified.²¹ These maidens are almost certainly the new inhabitants of the *sema*, since they receive hair-offerings when "the marriage song with its beautiful echoes frightens the abodes of the maidens" (vv. 296-297). The Delian boys offer the first crop of their beard, not to the maidens but their escorts, whom Herodotus called the Perpherees. Pausanias says, furthermore, that the maidens of Delos used to offer their hair to

²⁰ Geschichte der Griechische Religion I, 2 ed. (Munich, 1935) pp. 548-549.

²¹ Hymn 4. 278-299. Callimachus does not believe in the Hyperboreans any more than Herodotus did. But he can hardly argue the question in a poem, so he simply replaces them with the Arimaspi. He shows, however, that he is talking about the people ordinarily thought of as Hyperboreans: the present senders of the annual tribute (who must surely be the same as the first-senders whom Callimachus calls "Arimaspians") dwell "beyond Boreas" (281-282); and Upis, Loxo and Hecaerge are daughters of Boreas.

Opis and Hecaerge (I.43.4). His testimony seems independent of Herodotus and Callimachus, since the former does not attach this ceremony to Opis, while the latter includes Loxo and uses the *Oupis* form of the name, and from neither could Pausanias have inferred that the ceremony no longer takes place.

Our sources clearly diverge, but there is no need to regard any of them as mistaken. It is in fact dangerous; Pausanias confirms Callimachus, while to impugn the accuracy of Herodotus or his informants is to throw out of court more evidence — especially that for the collection-ritual — than anyone is willing to part with. The nature of the divergence has been generally overlooked: the rituals tend to persist, the mythology changes. More specifically, Hyperoche and Laodice disappear entirely, while Arge is replaced by the like-sounding Hecaerge, and she and Opis and Loxo are now said to have brought the Hyperborean tribute. Now Opis, as we have seen, is closely associated with Artemis; the word *ἐκαέργη* can have no other origin than as an epithet of Artemis, paralleling *ἐκαέργος* used of her brother.²² What has happened at the *sema*, therefore, is that maidens associated with Eileithyia are gone, and maidens associated with Artemis have taken their place; the natural inference is that after the time of Herodotus, Artemis absorbed Eileithyia. Now Eileithyia shared her sole function, midwifery, with Artemis, so that it is surprising that she maintained an independent existence on Delos as long as she did; her rôle at the birth of Apollo was no doubt responsible. But that she was independent until Callimachus' time, and that she was eventually absorbed, are confirmed by the fact that after the Hymn to Delos was written the contents of her sanctuary were transferred to the temple of Artemis.²³

The history of the "different honors" paid Opis and Arge is not dissimilar, though somewhat harder to trace. Callimachus does not mention the collection-ritual, which may have been abandoned or taken over by Artemis (since it so well suited her in her rôle

²² Cf. Branchus, quoted by Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.8: *μέλπετε ὦ παῖδες ἐκαέργον καὶ ἐκαέργαν*; other references in Lewis R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States II* (Oxford, 1896) p. 578. Loxo is of obscure origin; derivations from *λοξίας* and from *λοξῶπις* have been proposed (see Höfer in Roscher's *Lexikon* s.v. Opis).

²³ Gallet de Santerre, *Delos* (see note 1) p. 153. By 250 the Eileithyiaieum is no longer listed in the temple archives; see Th. Homolle, *Les Archives de l'Intendance Sacrée* (Paris, 1887), p. 129.

of agrarian goddess). But the hymn to Opis and Arge was probably still sung: "The men sing a *nomos* of the old man of Lycia, which Olen brought you (sc. Delos) from Xanthos; the maidens of the chorus beat the ground ceaselessly with their feet" (Hymn 4.304-306). Callimachus does not tell us to whom the *nomos* was sung, and certainly does not connect it with Upis and Hecaege, but Wilamowitz' argument that this is the hymn to Opis and Arge is still convincing. The Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo, which Callimachus knew, says that the Delian maidens sing a hymn calling to mind the men and women of old, and imitate the tongues and clatter (or chatter) of all men, and anyone present would say that he himself were singing (vv. 157 ff.). This suggests a song accompanied by a dance, using not merely different dialects but also foreign words, words "brought from Xanthos"; in other words, a hymn of Olen the Lycian, who as Herodotus says composed the ancient Delian hymns.²⁴ Since the hymn to Opis and Arge was not sung to or connected by Callimachus with Upis and Hecaege (the pages describing each are separated by a fresh invocation, vv. 300 f.), it too may have been taken over by Artemis. We hear of *Oupiggoi*, hymns sung in Troezen in honor of Artemis,²⁵ apparently descended from the hymn to Opis and Arge; the more important of the maidens will have lent her name to the song, which honors not her but Artemis, and this can easily have happened by Callimachus' time. Thus as Opis became an occupant of the *sema* she lost her original honors, while Arge became absorbed by, or vanished in favor of, Hecaege.

Eileithyia's decline was accompanied by another change: the Hyperborean tribute was presented to Apollo instead. Aelian, discussing the Pythian procession from Thessaly to Delphi, compares its reception with that accorded "those who bring the sacred objects from the Hyperboreans *to this same god*" (V.H. 3.1). In Pseudo-Plutarch *de Musica*, Soterichus, attempting to show that Apollo invented flute-playing as well as lyre-playing, brings up a number of instances where the god and the instru-

²⁴ The objections of E. Maass in Pauly-Wissowa's Realencyclopädie s.v. Olen are superficial, failing to allow for changes which can easily have occurred if Artemis eventually absorbed the ritual.

²⁵ Schol. Ap. Rhod. 1.972, Athen. p. 619b.

ments are connected: "And they say that the sacred objects from the Hyperboreans were anciently sent over to Delos in the midst of flutes and syrinxes and lyres" (de Mus. 14).²⁶ This passage in context implies that the gifts arrived during a festival of Apollo, and I shall now argue that between the middle of the fifth and the third centuries the coming of the Hyperborean tribute was made to coincide with the great festival called the Apollonia by the Delians and the Delia by the other Greeks.

In the middle of the fifth century the gifts probably arrived in Thargelion (roughly May), shortly after Apollo's birthday on the seventh;²⁷ otherwise it would seem absurd for the Delians to say that they were once given to Eileithyia for her help at that birth. Furthermore, the Delians are anxious to show that Opis and Arge came to the island before Hyperoché and Laodice, and the most plausible reason for their maintaining this is that the arrival of the Hyperborean offerings fell later in the calendar year than the festival of Arge and Opis.²⁸ This festival is likely to have been celebrated on or about the seventh of Thargelion, for otherwise the Delians' interpretation of the phrase ἅμα αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι θεοῖσι would have been implausible and pointless.²⁹ The tribute, like its original bearers, will have come a few weeks later.

²⁶ It is not possible to date this information; the subject of "they say" is indefinite.

²⁷ The birth date is given by Diogenes Laertius 3.2 (Nilsson, Gr. Feste 146). Other arguments favoring the arrival of the Hyperborean gifts after 7 Thargelion are given by Farnell, Cults IV (Oxford, 1907) 287 ff. (his dating of the Delia-Apollonia is probably not correct, see Nilsson Gr. Feste 144 ff.).

²⁸ The Delians must have had some reason for wanting to say that Opis and Arge came first, and a likely reason is that they were expressing a cult fact. Vallois (note 11) raises the same question somewhat differently: "Les Déliens ont affirmé devant Hérodote que Laodiké et Hyperoché étaient arrivées après la naissance d'Apollon. Comment l'auraient-ils su, si cette chronologie n'avait pas été justifiée par un rite vivant?" (p. 442). Vallois is surely right in basing the myth on a ritual. But his "living rite" is the post-natal *rite de morsure* (see note 11) whose existence is questionable; a much more likely rite is the arrival of the tribute soon after the birthday.

²⁹ The Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo suggests that the hymn to Opis and Arge was sung immediately after those to Apollo and his family during the panegyris (vv. 144-164), and therefore — if the panegyris always came in Hieros — not during the birthday festival. This would certainly mean that Opis and Arge came before Hyperoché and Laodice — i.e., that their festival came earlier in the year, which began around January — but would make it harder for the Delians to have interpreted ἅμα αὐτοῖσι τοῖσι θεοῖσι as meaning "at the birth of the gods." Still, it is clearly a good deal less necessary that this myth — which is after all but a misinterpretation of the phrase — should harmonize with the calendar, than

By the early third century changes have occurred. "Every year first-fruits are sent you," says Callimachus of Delos, "and all the cities lead in choruses" (Hymn 4.278-279); among them are those who send what we call the Hyperborean tribute. These lines probably refer to the annual form of the Apollonia, which in this century and probably from time immemorial, fell in the month of Hieros (roughly February), long before Apollo's birthday (Nilsson *Gr. Feste* 144 ff.). This means that by the third century the time of arrival of the Hyperborean gifts must have changed from late in Thargelion to Hieros and its sending made to coincide with a *theoria* to the Delia. Furthermore, Attica, which did not handle the tribute 200 years before (Herodotus 4.33), is now probably on its route. Callimachus does not say so, though he leaves room for it, but Pausanias was told that the gifts left for Delos from the Attic town of Prasiae (Pausanias 1.31.2); they left, in fact, from a temple of Apollo and were carried by Athenians, which clearly suggests that the gifts accompanied the Attic *theoria* to the Apollonia. Now it was the Athenians who, in 426/5, followed their purification of Delos by reinvigorating the Apollonia, adding to it quinquennial games of the same elaborateness as it had possessed at the time of the Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo (Thuc. 3.103). Hence it is plausible that the Delians took over the sending of the Hyperborean tribute after 425, combining it with their *theoria* to the Apollonia and thereby changing the time of the tribute's arrival from Thargelion to Hieros. And since Eileithyia no longer got it, the maidens associated with her, Hyperoche and Laodice, were no longer said to have brought it.

that the myth of Hyperoche and Laodice, who came with the tribute after the birthday, should express the fact that in the fifth century the gifts came after the 7th of Thargelion.

SIMON-PETER

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THE designation of one, and only one, of the Twelve Apostles is recorded to have been changed, with the result that he became known by a name different from (or else supplementary to) that which he bore originally: Simon (Simeon)¹ bar Jonah, "called Peter," the most prominent of the band. The circumstances of his renaming are recorded somewhat differently by the Evangelists. Mark (iii. 16) mentions the change summarily when he tells of the despatch of the Twelve on their mission; John (i. 42) associates it with Simon's original summons, near the scene of John's baptizing in the Jordan; Matthew (xvi. 18) describes the episode at greater length, bringing it into relation with Simon's recognition of Jesus as Messiah at Caesarea Philippi: while Luke overlooks the circumstances. Thus while there is no serious contradiction in the New Testament story about the details, there is on the other hand imperfect consistency,² and it is legitimate to reconsider the matter *ab initio*. Attention will be directed here therefore to a neglected parallel, which may conceivably throw light on the problem.

It has not been noted hitherto in this connection that in the first and second centuries the name Simeon or Simon seems to have had among the Jews some specific association or connotation (a reason will be tentatively suggested later), as a result of which it experienced peculiar vicissitudes.

1. In Jewish tradition from Talmudic times onwards, as is well known, the author of the Book of Ecclesiasticus was universally called "Ben Sira." In the original Hebrew text of the work found in the Cairo Genizah, however, he is styled "Simeon [ben Joshua ben Eleazar] ben Sira"; the personal name was thus

¹ I will use the Greek form Simon and Hebrew Simeon indiscriminately in this article.

² It has indeed been questioned whether the bearers of the two names were in fact identical: cf. K. Lake, Simon Cephas Peter in H.T.R., XIV (1921), 95-97 and G. La Piana, Cephas and Peter in the Epistle to the Galatians, *ibid.*, pp. 187-193. I am obliged to Professor A. D. Nock for calling my attention to these studies, as well as for other helpful criticism.

omitted in general parlance, only the patronymic being preserved.³

It is a most curious coincidence that a number of other personalities named Simeon or Simon, in the period of the birth of Christianity, are similarly known generally by their patronymics, their personal names being consistently eliminated. Moreover, this is the case only (or virtually only) with persons called Simeon.

The following further instances which illustrate the point may be assembled. All those persons here listed are normally called by the patronymic "Ben . . ." (or its Aramaic equivalent "Bar" . . .) meaning "son of . . .,"⁴ followed by the father's name, the *eigennamen* Simeon being omitted.

We may begin with three scholars, whose names are familiar to students of Rabbinic literature: —

2. [Simeon] ben Zoma, one of the four mystics "who entered Paradise" and lost his reason thereby: early second century (T. B. Hagigah 14b).

3. [Simeon] ben Azzai, his fellow-student, who died young (*ibid.*).

4. [Simeon] ben Nanos, expert especially on civil law: referred to by his patronymic only in Mishnah Gittin viii. 10, Baba Bathra vii. 3, x. 8 and Shebuoth vii. 5, but as Simeon ben Nanos in Bikkurim iii. 9, Shabbath xvi. 5 and Erubin x. 15.

More significant than these is the case of: —

5. Bar Kochba, the leader of the Jewish Revolt of 132/5. He is known in the Talmudic literature as well as in the writings of the Church Fathers (Justin, Eusebius) only by this name, but "Simeon, Prince of Israel" figures on the coins minted under his regime, and it was long ago suggested that this was his personal name: the conjecture has been confirmed by the remarkable administrative letters of this period recently found in the Dead Sea region, written in the name of "Simeon bar Kosiba, Prince of Israel."⁵

³ Cf. the preface to M. H. Segal's edition of the Hebrew text. The fact that in the Greek text the form is different (Jesus/Joshua, son of Sirach) has no bearing on the present question, though highly interesting in itself.

⁴ With the reservation that in some cases the term may denote not affiliation but geographical origin.

⁵ Bar Kosiba (probably = the Man of Cosiba) was apparently the original form of the name, popularly replaced by Bar Kochba or the Son of the Star, in

By the side of Simeon bar Kochba we may appropriately place: —

6. Simon bar Giora, the outstanding Jewish patriot leader of the First Revolt: for Tacitus (*Historiae* v. 12) uses "Bargioras" as a name not a patronymic (and apparently without realizing that it was one: "quem et Bargioram vocabant"): cf. also Dio Cassius lxvi. 7 (from the epitome of Xiphilinus), who does not know an alternative name.⁶

To these we may hesitantly add some less positive cases: —

7. Simeon ben Jochai, *tanna* of the second century, reputed author of the Zohar and a notorious anti-Roman, is remembered as Ben (Bar) Jochai in Jewish popular tradition and folk-hymns, without contemporary evidence.

8. The early (third century) Palestinian *amora* R. Simeon ben Lakish is universally referred to as "Rish Lakish." This is probably an outcome of the abbreviation of his name in written texts. On the other hand, it is reported that his master and colleague, R. Johanan, called out agonizedly after his death: "Where is Bar Lekisha, where is Bar Lekisha" (T.B., Baba Metsia, f. 84a).⁷

One point must be emphasized before we go further. It is not

reference to Numbers xxiv. 17 and the "Star that was to come forth from Jacob," the essential Messianic prophecy in the opinion of the time. That the form Bar Kosiba was not relinquished, as the newly-found letters show, does not affect the fact that it was subsequently applied by the Rabbis in a derogatory sense in the slightly different form Bar Koziba, the Son of Deceit. The term *kzb* seems to have been applied consistently at this period to a leader who falsely claimed Divine approval: such are referred to in the Qumran literature by such titles as the Preacher of Deceit (*Habakkuk Commentary* ii. 1-2 &c.), the Man of Deceit (*ibid.*, x. 9).

⁶ Tacitus too be sure confuses him as it appears with the rival patriot leader John of Gischala ("Ioannes quem et Bargioram vocabant"): apparently he had heard reports of the exploits of the two chieftains and thought that the same man was in question. In any case, it is clear that the name "Bar Giora" was known to the Romans in this form, for which indeed we have only the authority of the Latin historians (Josephus gives the Greek equivalent).

⁷ The suggestion has been made that Simon Magus of Acts, viii. 20-4 is identical with the Cypriot magician mentioned by Josephus (*Ant.* xx. 7:2) and hence with the Cypriot Bar Jesus of Acts, xiii. 6-11, in which case we would be provided with yet another instance. But the possibility is very slight. On the other hand, attention may be drawn to the shadowy existence of a first-century Simeon, reputed son of Hillel and ancestor of the later Patriarchal dynasty, whose actual existence is now generally questioned: once again, a mystery is attached to this same name.

simply that in a number of cases we find the *eigennome* "Simeon" omitted, persons so called being known only by their patronymic: but in almost every case in the literature of this period where a well-known person is consistently referred to by his patronymic, and we know his *eigennome*, that *eigennome* was Simeon. There are a number of other cases to be sure (e.g. the curiously named Ben Hai-hai, one of whose aphorisms is recorded in the Ethics of the Fathers, v. 26, and especially several individuals, otherwise undistinguished, mentioned in connection with the Temple organization and service) of persons known only by their patronymic: there are a few other cases moreover of well-known scholars being occasionally called by their patronymic.⁸ These instances do not, however, affect the general picture. So far as well-known persons are concerned, it is only in the case of those named Simeon that the *eigennome* is consistently omitted: and in any case the number of persons named Simeon with whom this is the case, whether or not well-known, equals that of bearers of all other names combined.⁹

The instances given above establish the point that Simeon (Simon) was a name the use of which was commonly or even methodically modified or eliminated, for some reason or the other, among the Jews at the beginning of the Christian era. One finds it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the modification of the name of the Apostle by the elimination of "Simon" was connected with this and due to the same cause, whatever that may have been.

It is perhaps germane to point out that Simon was a peculiarly "patriotic" name at the period we are considering, for whether by chance or otherwise one after the other of the great national

⁸ The appellation "son of . . ." was apparently used in a more familiar form of address: naturally therefore in the case of Temple servitors &c. It has been suggested that sometimes even a well-known scholar would be referred to in this way before his ordination: e.g. in one case even R. Johanan ben Zakkai (M. Sanhedrin v. 2).

⁹ The point is emphasized by a glance at the Index to Danby's English translation of the Mishnah, s.v. Ben. This is amplified there in only seven cases, two of them being conjectural: of the remaining five, four refer to a Simeon. As against eight omissions of the name Simeon I have been able to trace in all at this period, I find Eleazar similarly omitted in the sources in a total of three cases, Judah in two or three, Johanan in two: but in none of these instances systematically, as in the case before us.

and revolutionary leaders of the time bore it. The following are to be mentioned: —

1. Simon, the last of the Hasmonaean brothers, who brought the Maccabaeen revolt to its final culmination of success, was formally recognized as the Ethnarch of the Jewish people and without adopting the title of King was the actual founder of the Hasmonaean monarchy.

2. Simon the High Priest, lauded by Ecclesiasticus (Chapter 50) as the ideal ruler: probably identical with Simeon the Just, the ideal High Priest-Rabbi of this period in Rabbinic and Talmudic recollection.

3. Simeon ben Shetah, the politician-Rabbi of the second century B.C.

4. Simon, a former slave, who rose in rebellion in Transjordan after the death of Herod in 4 B.C., raided Jericho, and apparently proclaimed himself King: he was killed in the subsequent fighting (Josephus, B.J. ii. 4:2; Ant. xvii. 10:6).

5. Simon, son of the revolutionary leader Judah the Galilean (founder of the Zealots), who with his brother Jacob led a revolt against Rome during the procuratorship of Tiberius Alexander (A.D. 46/8) and was executed (Ant. xx. 5:2).

6. Simon bar Giora, the ultimate leader and ultimate martyr of the Jewish revolt of 66/70.

7. Simeon bar Kochba, leader of the Second Revolt of 132/5.

It is obvious from the instances that have been assembled above in our first list that the use of the name Simon was often for some reason or the other avoided or suppressed by Jews at the beginning of the Christian era: it appears possible from the second list of names that it was avoided for some patriotic reason. What precisely this was, however, must remain a matter of conjecture.

Could the use of the name have been forbidden by the Romans because of its hyper-patriotic associations? Or can it be that for the same reason it was held too sacred for normal use by some nationalistic Jews? In that case, one can well imagine why persons who bore the names felt themselves later to be designated to be their people's leaders ("nomen sit omen!"), this explaining why the outstanding leader of the Second Revolt bore the same

name as the outstanding leader of the First (a perpetual source of confusion for numismatists). After defeat the inhibition would naturally have become all the stronger.¹⁰

On the other hand, the relevant passage in the Blessing of Jacob (Genesis xlv. 5-7) is perhaps significant: — "Simeon and Levi are brethren; weapons of violence their tools. Let my soul not come into their counsel; unto their assembly let my glory not be united . . . I will divide them in Jacob, and scatter them in Israel." It may, very hesitantly, be suggested that in view of this comminatory verse an inhibition against the explicit use of the name Simeon began to spread among the Jews in the first century, with the result that a person so called was referred to only by a periphrasis ("the son of so-and-so") or a nickname (such as "Kaipha" = Peter would have been). The inhibition might not have applied to Levi, whose later tribal record expiated the grim episode of Sichem: moreover, the scattering of that tribe in Israel was fulfilled favorably in a sacerdotal fashion.¹¹ It may be then that, in the period we are considering, an inauspicious proto-Midrashic interpretation of the passage regarding Simeon in the Blessing of Jacob became current, in consequence of which the use of the name came to be avoided.¹²

However that may be, it seems certain that in the first century and perhaps for some time afterwards the use of the name Simon was deliberately avoided by Jews, whether from symbolic or

¹⁰ It is curious that the other names occasionally omitted in favor of a patronymic (see above) also had patriotic undertones: Johanan (cf. John of Gischala, one of the outstanding leaders of the First Revolt) and Eleazar (cf. Eleazar ben Dinaï, who led an uprising about A.D. 44: Eleazar ben Hannaniah, Captain of the Temple at the outbreak of the First Revolt: Eleazar ben Simon, the Zealot leader: Eleazar ben Jair, who led the Sicarii of Masadah: and Eleazar the Priest, second leader of the Revolt of 132/5 after Simeon bar Kochba). The patriotic implications of the name Judah need not be stressed.

¹¹ Nevertheless, the name of Levi was not apparently favored among the Jews at this time: in Josephus' Jewish War, for example, only two persons bearing the name are mentioned, as against eleven bearing the name Judah. Too much attention cannot be attached, however, to this: other of the Tribal names (e.g. Asher, Reuben) do not figure at all.

¹² It may perhaps be noted that the name of Simeon is omitted in the Blessing of Moses in Deuteronomy, and in connection with this the Rabbis noted that this Tribe alone never produced any King in Israelite history. Conceivably some more precise Midrash on the verse, now lost, was current at the time, which would help to solve our problem.

patriotic or superstitious reasons, or even out of sheer nervousness.¹³

Hence the picture of Peter's change of name seems to present itself in a light which differs somewhat from the accepted and traditional account. His original name was Simeon (Simon), to which was added as a sort of nickname or byname the Aramaic Kaipha (= Rock), perhaps referring to his physical characteristics or firmness of character. The name Simeon was commonly omitted for some reason,¹⁴ probably patriotic, as was at this time usual with persons bearing this designation. The name Kaipha (= Peter) was thus left. At a later stage, this change was naturally given a more elaborate explanation.¹⁵

¹³ In view of this it seems possible that the 'brigand' or rebel Barabbas, who was saved by the popular clamor from crucifixion, was in fact *Simeon* bar Abbas, though the tradition recorded by Origen preserved the name Joshua (Jesus).

¹⁴ Not necessarily in his lifetime: as (apparently) in the case of Ben Sira, the inhibition against the use may have been applied retrospectively — perhaps only after the Fall of Jerusalem in 70.

¹⁵ In order to exhaust all possible solutions of the phenomenon, one may set down the remote and unlikely explanation that the use of the name Simeon was avoided among Jews — retrospectively also — after the middle of the first century precisely because of the defection of St. Peter from Judaism. He was in fact the only one of the Apostles whose name remained familiar in Jewish circles, though in a strange connotation: a medieval Hebrew legend told how he organized Christianity as a separate faith only in order to save Judaism from contamination, and even subsequently made his contribution to the synagogal liturgy from his fastness in Rome.

THE EARLY COLERIDGE: HIS "RAGE FOR METAPHYSICS"

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IN 1797-98 Coleridge wrote a series of five autobiographical letters in which he presumably recounted everything which he remembered or had been told regarding the period from his birth (21 October, 1772) to his departure from Christ's Hospital in 1791. As it turned out, these first recollections were only a beginning, for Coleridge continued to add to them for the greater part of his life, the most notable additions being contained in the *Biographia Literaria* and in the biographical notes which he gave to James Gillman. When all of the recollections are assembled, they present an account of the boy Coleridge which would seem hardly creditable even if it were consistent, and it has seemed much less creditable when it is compared with the account furnished by the juvenilia. For this reason, perhaps, the account given by the recollections has presented a problem to biographers. Some of them have dismissed it altogether as a creation of Coleridge's over-active imagination; others have respected it by ignoring the juvenilia or by dealing with the recollections and the juvenilia separately, as if they related to two different persons. In no instance has anyone attempted to reconcile the two accounts.¹ It has seemed to me that such a reconciliation ought to be attempted; for, to the extent that the recollections are dependable, they should provide an invaluable clue, not only to an understanding of Coleridge's early writings, but, more importantly, to an understanding of the basis and direction of his mature thought. It is my intention, therefore, to make the at-

¹ Of the biographers, Brandl perhaps has the greatest respect for Coleridge's recollections, especially for his recollections regarding Plotinus. See Alois Brandl, *Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the English Romantic School* (London, 1887), pp. 21-23. But, assuming for a reason which is not clear to me that Coleridge could not have read the *Enneads* in Greek, Brandl limits Coleridge's acquaintance with that work to the doctrine of the beautiful, as it was presented in English by William Taylor, and he makes no attempt to reconcile this doctrine with the juvenilia. As it happens, the doctrine of the beautiful is the one aspect of Plotinian thought which Coleridge disregarded.

tempt. I shall present, first of all, Coleridge's recollections regarding his early years, and I shall then try to interpret them and to interpret the juvenilia in the light of them, insofar as the recollections seem to be warranted. Since I shall be primarily interested in Coleridge's intellectual development, I have chosen to deal elsewhere with the influence of Bowles, which, though crucially important, has no direct bearing on Coleridge's "metaphysics."²

I

From the vantage point of maturity, Coleridge could remember no real childhood: "I never thought as a child," he recalled, "never had the language of a child."³ For one thing, he had an early and persistent tendency toward mysticism: "from my very childhood," he remarked in 1820, "I [was] accustomed to abstract and as it were unrealize whatever of more than common interest my eye dwelt on; and then by a sort of transference and transmission of my consciousness to identify myself with the Object. . . ."⁴ For another thing, he was endowed with intellectual "talents and superiority" as well as with "logical powers . . . so stupendous from boyhood, as never to require . . . drilling."⁵ An early ability to "read & spell," he remembered, combined with "a memory & understanding forced into almost an unnatural ripeness,"⁶ placed him at once and "for ever at the head in [his] routine of study, though utterly without the desire to be so."⁷ From the age of ten on, he added, he was generally regarded as

² See Werkmeister, "Coleridge, Bowles, and 'Feelings of the Heart,'" *Anglia*, LXXVII (1960), 55-73.

³ James Gillman, *The Life of Samuel Taylor Coleridge* (London, 1838), I, 10.

⁴ Unpublished Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (London, 1932), II, 262. The similarity between this recollection and a passage from the *Enneads*, which Coleridge quotes in the *Biographia*, is not without significance. See *Biographia Literaria*. By S. T. Coleridge, ed. John Shawcross (London, 1907), I, 80.

⁵ Gillman, I, 20, 34.

⁶ *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (Oxford, 1956), I, 347-348.

⁷ Gillman, I, 20. It might be mentioned that, when Boyer first inquired about him, he was told that Coleridge was "a dull and inapt scholar, and that he could not be made to repeat a single rule of syntax, although he would give a rule in his own way" (Gillman, I, 19).

"a prodigy, &c &c &c,"⁸ and, by the time he reached "twelve or fourteen," he would "have made as pretty a juvenile prodigy as was ever emasculated and ruined by fond and idle wonderment." He could only "Thank Heaven" that he "was flogged instead of flattered."⁹

Meanwhile books became a passion. Chapters of the Bible, which Coleridge recalled reading at the age of three,¹⁰ were replaced by "tales of Tom Hickathrift, Jack the Giant-killer, &c &c &c &c &c." At the age of six, he was reading "Belisarius, Robinson Crusoe, & Philip Quarle [sic]"¹¹ and very shortly thereafter "the *History of St. George*, . . . the *Seven Champions of Christendom*," and "the *Arabian Nights' Entertainment*." He always regarded the reading of these romances as crucial in his development, although he vacillated somewhat on the reason for its importance. On one occasion he asserted that from romances he first learned to love his fellow beings, "because," as he put it, "I first learnt the powers of my nature, and to reverence that nature — for who can feel and reverence the nature of man and not feel deeply the affliction of others possessing like powers and like nature?"¹² On another occasion he maintained that "from my early reading of Faery Tales, & Genii &c &c — my mind had been habituated to the *Vast* — & I never regarded my senses in any way as the criteria of my belief. I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions not by my *sight* — even at that age."¹³ From the ages of eight to fourteen, Coleridge was a veritable "helluo librorum."¹⁴ Happily, his rhetorical powers, which had always impressed everyone with whom he "talked and disputed,"¹⁵ now proved uniquely helpful; for he was "made . . . free of a circulating library in King Street, Cheapside," by "a stranger, who was struck by [his] conversation," so that, while he was at Christ's Hospital, he was able to "indulge his love of reading"

⁸ Collected Letters, I, 388.

⁹ Gillman, I, 21.

¹⁰ Collected Letters, I, 312.

¹¹ Collected Letters, I, 347. Coleridge later indicated that he did not read Robinson Crusoe until he was fourteen (Gillman, I, 20).

¹² Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (London, 1895), I, 11, note.

¹³ Collected Letters, I, 354.

¹⁴ Gillman, I, 17.

¹⁵ Collected Letters, I, 388.

to the full. The result was, he said, that he "read *through* the catalogue [of the library], folios and all, whether I understood them, or did not understand them, running all risks in skulking out to get the two volumes which I was entitled to have daily. . . . My whole being was . . . to crumple myself up in a sunny corner, and read, read, read."¹⁶

At first, being "wild to be apprenticed to a surgeon," he read "English, Latin, yea, Greek books of medicine," almost memorizing "Blanchard's Latin Medical Dictionary." But, before his "fifteenth year," this "wild dream" of becoming a surgeon, "gradually blending with, gradually gave way to a rage for metaphysics, occasioned by the essays on Liberty and Necessity in Cato's Letters, and more by theology."¹⁷ The "rage" seems also to have been stimulated by personal problems, for in 1802 Coleridge declared that "Sickness & some other & worse afflictions, first forced me into downright *metaphysics*."¹⁸ All of his intellectual energies were now directed toward philosophy and theology. "History, and particular facts," he remembered, "lost all interest in my mind. Poetry . . . itself, yea, novels and romances, became insipid to me" as "I . . . bewildered myself in metaphysicks, and in theological controversy." Obsessed by problems

Of providence, fore-knowledge, will, and fate,
Fix'd fate, free will, fore-knowledge absolute,

he broached these "favorite subjects" in casual conversations with strangers, especially clergymen,

And found no end in wandering mazes lost.¹⁹

He remembered reading during this period "Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary," as a result of which he "sporting infidel" for a while, albeit with a "vanity" which never "touched [his] heart," for "in my heart," he assured Gillman, "I never lost the name of Christ."²⁰ He remembered, too, reading "Plato and Plotinus with the commentaries and the THEOLOGIA PLATONICA of [Fici-

¹⁶ Gillman, I, 17, 20.

¹⁷ Gillman, I, 23.

¹⁸ Collected Letters, I, 814.

¹⁹ Biographia, I, 9-10.

²⁰ Gilman, I, 23.

nus]" and also Proclus and George Gemisthus Pletho.²¹ Lamb, who seems also to have relied upon Coleridge's memory, added Jamblichus to the list, reporting that Coleridge was accustomed to expound the "mysteries" of Jamblichus and Plotinus to "the casual passer through the Cloisters" of Christ's Hospital.²²

From this "preposterous pursuit," which was already proving "injurious both to [his] natural powers, and to the progress of [his] education" and would ultimately have proved "destructive," Coleridge was, according to his recollection, happily "withdrawn" in his "seventeenth year" by the discovery of Bowles's sonnets, which freed his "fancy," his "love of nature," his "sense of beauty in forms and sounds," and, most important, his "heart" from their metaphysical enthrallment and allowed his "original tendencies to develope themselves." Although by 1817 he could still fervently wish that he had "continued to pluck the flower and reap the harvest from the cultivated surface, instead of delving in the unwholesome quicksilver mines of metaphysic [sic] depths," he was compelled to admit that his "former passion for metaphysical investigations" was not altogether vain; for he had learned from the "investigations" that even "the conditions and criteria of poetic style" had "a solid foundation . . . in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance."²³

II

Since, if his early genius expressed itself in writings, the writings are not now extant, it is difficult to determine the accuracy of much of the account which Coleridge gave of his early childhood. The assertion that he learned to spell at an early age is somewhat ironic, however, since he never mastered spelling, as he never mastered any of the mechanics of language. However "stupendous" his "memory" and "logical powers" may have been in other respects, they never extended to such matters as punctuation,

²¹ *Biographia*, I, 94.

²² Charles Lamb, "Christ's Hospital Five and Thirty Years Ago." But see Coleridge's statement that Lamb's essay was "chiefly compiled from recollections of what he had heard from me" (Unpublished Letters, II, 274).

²³ *Biographia*, I, 10, 14.

grammar, and rhetoric. Moreover, his earliest extant writing, a letter, dated February, 1785, hardly supports his boasts that he was "*a prodigy, &c &c &c.*" From the point of view of either composition or content, the letter is not remarkable for a boy of twelve, and it is sharply inferior to letters which other Coleridges were sending home at that age.²⁴ It reflects none of the intellectual acumen which presumably characterized its author, and it even presents evidence that Coleridge's high opinion of his disputative powers was not necessarily shared by others. At least, Luke's recommendation of Burgh's *Art of Speaking* as a work which Coleridge would find "of great use"²⁵ indicates that his brother regarded these powers as capable of some improvement.

With Coleridge's second extant writing, another letter, the recollections become more helpful. This letter is dated May, 1787, more than two years after the first and five months before Coleridge's fifteenth birthday. By this time, therefore, the "[wildness] to be apprenticed to a surgeon" has supposedly given way to the "rage for metaphysics," which in late 1789 or 1790 will in turn supposedly give way to the interest in nature and poetry. Coleridge seems to have been correct in dating the onset of the "rage," at least; for the letter indicates that by mid-1787 he is well into his "metaphysical investigations," with the "infidel vanity," in fact, already behind him. He can now speak of the unbelievers with the tolerant amusement of a sophisticate. "It is remarkable how zealous all these infidels are to persuade you to embrace their fantastical doctrines," he confides to his brother. "Addison finely says: 'They play for nothing: if they win, they win nothing; but if they lose —.['] *We* are safe on both sides.'" But, although it is clear that the author of this letter no longer regards himself as one of "these infidels," it is far from clear that he is secure in the faith. His "heart" may never have "lost the name of Christ," but his intellect sees no reason to ally itself with the Christians except the simple reason of expedience. Meanwhile the letter goes on to request a copy of "Young's night

²⁴ See Lord Coleridge, K. C., *The Story of a Devonshire House* (London, 1905).

²⁵ *Collected Letters*, I, 1. Luke was still recommending this work two years later, even offering to make Coleridge a gift of it (see *Collected Letters*, I, 2-3).

thoughts,"²⁶ which is almost a handbook for anyone concerned with problems

Of providence, fore-knowledge, will, and fate,
Fix'd fate, free will, fore-knowledge absolute.

If Coleridge was correct in saying that his "investigations" were "occasioned by the essays on Liberty and Necessity in Cato's Letters, and more by theology," he must have read both the Letters and the "theology" by at least March. It is hardly necessary to ask why he read them, since, according to his recollection, he was "reading *through*" the entire "catalogue" of a library; the sole question, therefore, is why they should have touched off a two-year "rage for metaphysics."

The answer to this question is somewhat complex. To begin with, Coleridge's statement that, when he read the essays and the "theology," he was "wild to be apprenticed to a surgeon" and that it was this "wild dream" which, gradually blending with, gradually gave way to the "rage for metaphysics" implies that there was a very close bond between the two interests. His further statement that it was ultimately "Sickness & some other & worse afflictions" which "first forced [him] into downright *metaphysics*" implies that this bond was the fact of his own suffering: it was suffering, Coleridge seems to suggest, which first "forced" him into medicine, and it was suffering which later "forced" him to desert medicine for "metaphysics." But, although it is understandable that "Sickness" could "force" anyone to become interested in medicine, the connection between Coleridge's "Sickness" and his "rage for metaphysics" becomes obvious only when one glances at the content of "Cato's essays on Liberty and Necessity." In brief, "Cato"²⁷ was contending, first, that the sole cause of human suffering is vice and, second, that vice cannot be ameliorated by human effort. Although man possesses a faculty of freedom, the "reason," he has, according to "Cato," paid for the sin of Adam with the subjugation of this faculty, which now functions only as a tool of the very passions it was originally

²⁶ Collected Letters, I, 2, 3.

²⁷ "Cato" is a pseudonym for John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, whose Letters originally formed part of the controversy between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins. "Cato" was defending Collins.

intended to control. The result is that man is necessarily vicious and therefore necessarily wretched. "Cato" freely admitted that God causes human suffering, but he denied that God was therefore evil. Such terms as *evil* and *injustice* have no meaning for God, "Cato" explained: these are human inventions arising from man's inability to comprehend the divine plan.²⁸ When one remembers Coleridge's observations regarding his early tendencies, it is clear that he was bound to prefer "Cato's" diagnosis to the medical diagnosis. For one thing, his "mind had been habituated to the Vast" through his reading of romances; and "Cato's" diagnosis placed human suffering in a cosmic, rather than a narrowly scientific context. Moreover, the list of books which Coleridge remembered reading as a child indicates no interest in science, but the interest in religion is evident; and "Cato's" diagnosis was ultimately theological. Finally, and by far the most important, Coleridge was an intuitionist, or, as he put it, "I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions not by my *sight* — even at that age."²⁹ Actually "Cato" was not an intuitionist. He was as much of an empiricist as the medical scientists, justifying his diagnosis throughout on the basis of observed human behavior. But he afforded Coleridge the opportunity to exercise his own intuition, with the result that Coleridge discovered in himself the "proof" of "Cato's" diagnosis; for he found in his own nature the presence of guilt, and he became unalterably convinced that it alone accounted for his wretchedness.

The point of departure, expressed or implied, of all the "metaphysical" juvenilia is therefore the awful fact of guilt and its necessary concomitant, suffering. In two of the more frankly autobiographical poems, both intended as farewells to the "much-lov'd cloisters," Coleridge deplores the loss of his own innocence

²⁸ Cato's Letters (London, 1723-24), III, 11, 145; IV, 174-190, 295.

²⁹ It is clear from the continuation of this quotation that by *conception* Coleridge means imaginative insight or what he was later to call the "sense of certainty." Thus he goes on to say, "Those who have been led to the same truths step by step thro' the constant testimony of their senses, seem to me to want a sense which I possess. . . . — It is true, that the mind *may* become credulous & prone to superstition by [reliance upon this intuitive sense] — but are not the Experimentalists credulous even to madness in believing any absurdity, rather than believe the grandest truths, if they have not the testimony of their own senses in their favor?" (Collected Letters, I, 354).

and with it his happiness and joy. In the first, he finds himself still "too mindful" of the "fair Delights"

which Joy from Eden stole
While Innocence stood smiling by! ³⁰

In the second, he refers still more pointedly to those "happy days,"

When 'neath your arches, free from every stain,
I heard of guilt and wonder'd at the tale! ³¹

Precisely when this fall occurred is not clear. In all probability it cannot be precisely dated, since in another poem Coleridge indicates that a fall is not an event, but a process recognizable only in retrospect:

In some gay hour Vice steals into the breast;
Perchance she wears some softer Virtue's vest.
By unperceiv'd degrees she tempts to stray,
Till far from Virtue's path she leads the feet away.³²

It is perhaps enough to know that the fall occurred some time after Coleridge entered Christ's Hospital. Far more important is the date of his recognition of it, but here, too, it is probably impossible to be specific. Since the shift from medicine to "metaphysics" was "gradual," the recognition was probably also gradual. One may suppose, however, that it was complete by May, 1787, for in "Easter Holidays" Coleridge can reflect upon the innocence and joy of his schoolmates only because his own innocence and joy are now but memories. Although he is no older than they in years, he is infinitely older in experience, for he has known guilt and suffering.

It is somewhat ironic that, although his "investigations" were motivated almost entirely by the desire to find a cure for his own "afflictions," Coleridge was compelled to repudiate the diagnosis of medical science, which, attributing the cause to some physical accident or disfunction, promised him a cure, in favor of "Cato's"

³⁰ "Absence / A Farewell Ode on Quitting School for Jesus College, Cambridge."

³¹ "Sonnet on Quitting School for College."

³² "Progress of Vice," lines 5-8.

diagnosis, which, attributing the cause to vice, denied categorically that a cure was possible. It is even more ironic that the very same insight which compelled him to accept "Cato's" diagnosis made it imperative for him to reject "Cato's" prognosis. For, whereas the "afflictions" which "forced" him into medicine were probably only "Sickness," the "afflictions" now included "other & worse" torments: those derived from an awareness of guilt. His problem now was to find a cure for vice or, more essentially, to establish the fact of human freedom: to show that man is capable of becoming virtuous and thereby capable of regaining the serenity, happiness, and joy of his original innocence. Coleridge's observation that the "rage for metaphysics" was "occasioned" even "more by theology" than by "Cato's essays" indicates that he first sought a solution for his problem in another "theology." Although this "theology" is not identified, it seems reasonable to suppose that it was the theology outlined in the Thirty-Nine Articles, which he may have examined critically for the first time. When, instead of freedom, he was offered predestination and, instead of virtue, forgiveness, he became for a while, with the assistance of "Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary," an "infidel."³³ Even when his infidelity gave way to a belief in god, it was not the trinitarian god of the Anglican Church. At last Coleridge found what promised to be a solution in "metaphysics," that is, in the teachings of the Neoplatonic mystics.

When one considers Coleridge's problem and his various intellectual tendencies, it is evident that his "rage for metaphysics" could have been only a "rage" for Neoplatonism. In no other philosophy could he find the assistance he needed within a framework which he would find comfortable. Since, under these circumstances, it would be a coincidence indeed if he chanced upon Neoplatonism in the course of his reading "*through* the catalogue," one is inclined to suspect that he deliberately consulted it, possibly because was already acquainted with Plato's position and hence with the tenor of Neoplatonic thought. As to which of the Neoplatonists he read, there is good reason to accept his own list. Such was the urgency of his problem that he would probably have read all the Neoplatonic writings which the library

³³ Voltaire himself was of course a deist, not an "infidel."

afforded, although not necessarily with understanding. The only influence which is traceable, however, is that of Plotinus. Until 1789 Coleridge's thinking is thoroughly Plotinian; and, even when it deviates from Plotinus, as it does after that time, the deviation is in the nature of a personal critique.³⁴ It is sometimes suggested that his reading of Plotinus was confined to Thomas Taylor's translation of the *Essay on the Beautiful*, but this suggestion can be discarded. The problem of beauty *per se* did not interest Coleridge at the time, and Plotinus's remarks on the problem which did interest him were so scattered that he could have found them only by going through the whole of the *Enneads*. As to when he read the Neoplatonists, one can say only that "Easter Holidays," which was composed by May, 1787, is thoroughly Plotinian in its point of view, and there is no evidence of a development or alteration in that point of view prior to 1789.

As one would expect, "Easter Holidays" is concerned with the problem of suffering; and, as one would expect, too, remembering Coleridge's statement that he had learned from his reading of romances to "feel deeply the affliction of others possessing . . . powers and . . . [a] nature" like his own, it is concerned with the suffering of his schoolmates. Listening to their "shouts of joy" and "jocund noise," Coleridge reflects that the young do not suffer; nor are they aware of the suffering which inevitably lies ahead, for their innocence conceals all such knowledge from them:

little think their joyous hearts
Of dire Misfortune's varied smarts
Which youthful years conceal:
Thoughtless of bitter-smiling Woe
Which all mankind are born to know
And they themselves must feel.

They must "feel" misfortune because they must fall from their present state of innocence. But, although the innocence itself can never be recaptured, they can achieve virtue, and virtue will

³⁴ It is true that after 1789 Coleridge agreed with Proclus, Jamblichus, and the Renaissance group in limiting man's moral freedom, but his arguments are totally different from theirs, and it is therefore doubtful that he was influenced by them. By this time he had reached an impasse in his own thinking which was bound to result in scepticism without any assistance from the "metaphysicians."

fortify them against further suffering. Hence the conclusion of the poem is optimistic:

[For] he who Wisdom's paths shall keep
And Virtue firm that scorns to weep
At ills in Fortune's power,
Through this life's variegated scene
In raging storms or calm serene
Shall cheerful spend the hour.

While steady Virtue guides his mind
Heav'n-born Content he still shall find
That never sheds a tear:
Without respect to any tide
His hours away in bliss shall glide
Like Easter all the year.

Here is Coleridge's answer to "Cato" and "theology." It is true, he admits, that everyone is subject to misfortunes, but the good man is not affected by them, and virtue is attainable. Hence, although misfortune is a universal "calamity," it is not a divine punishment: the punishment lies in the suffering, and suffering is reserved for the vicious. This is, of course, the Plotinian solution to the problem, borrowed from the Stoics, and on the whole it is to remain Coleridge's solution.³⁵ The manner in which virtue is to be attained is explained in the poems which follow.

Coleridge's explanation, which is given in the form of instructions to youth, parallels Plotinus's. First of all, there must be a renunciation of extravagant worldly desires. In poem after poem, therefore, "Reason" admonishes the would-be virtuous to "describe Life's plan" on a "narrow scale":³⁶ to resist the temptations of adventure and ambition and in general so to discipline the body that its appetites and passions do not interfere with the activities of the soul. Second, there must be an adherence to "Wisdom's paths."³⁷ Although Coleridge does not himself define the

³⁵ See *Enneads*, I, ii, 1, 5; I, iv, 4-8, 12, 15; III, ii, 4-7; IV, iii, 16. Although Coleridge later doubted that virtue is attainable, he continued to believe that the good do not suffer. See, for example, "Dejection: An Ode," lines 76-83.

³⁶ "Happiness," lines 1-2; but see the whole poem, and see also "Dura Navis" and "Nil Pejus est Caelibe Vita." Cf. *Enneads*, I, ii, 5; I, iv, 5, 12, 14; IV, iv, 21, 44; IV, viii, 2; VI, iv, 14-16.

³⁷ "Easter Holidays," line 25.

term *wisdom*, he seems to accept the definition of Plotinus, who regarded it as the contemplation of all as a manifestation of the Intellectual Principle. According to Plotinus, "Wisdom" is an intellection, an awakening of the soul from the slumber brought about by its union with a body to a reawareness of truths about God, the world, and especially about its own high destiny. "Wisdom" is not reasoning, but the culmination of a long intellectual discipline which is possible only through reasoning. The soul begins its ascent by reasoning about the world, it goes on to reason about itself, and at this point it abandons reasoning, which is an inferior occupation, and employs itself in contemplation.³⁸ So evidently Coleridge supposes, for, as he puts it:

o'er the midnight Lamp I'd love to pore,
I'd seek with care fair Learning's depths to sound,
And gather scientific Lore:
Or to mature the embryo thoughts inclin'd,
That half-conceiv'd lay struggling in my mind,
The cloisters' solitary gloom I'd round.³⁹

For Coleridge, as for Plotinus,⁴⁰ therefore, "virtue" is ultimately purgation. The pure soul is good, and "vice" results from the obtrusion upon it of elements alien to it. Once the soul is freed from alien elements and encouraged to resume its characteristic activity, contemplation, it re-asserts its original goodness. At the same time, it becomes immune to misfortune, for misfortune can affect only the body, to which it is no longer subservient.

According to Plotinus, the soul may rise even above contemplation. Just as reasoning prepares it for contemplation, so contemplation prepares it for the vision of The First or The One. Although, strictly speaking, the vision belongs to the Intellectual Principle, not to the soul, it penetrates to the soul in momentary flashes. When it does so, contemplation itself is laid aside, and the soul becomes reunited in mystical ecstasy with that radiance which is the source of the very Intellectual Principle which

³⁸ See *Enneads*, I, ii, 6; I, viii, 1; III, vi, 6; IV, iii, 26-27; IV, iv, 5; IV, vii, 10; IV, viii, 1; V, i, 1, 3, 7; V, iii, 4; V, ix, 7.

³⁹ "Quae Nocent Docent," lines 7-12. "The cloisters' solitary gloom" refers only to the cloisters of Christ's Hospital. Coleridge had as little regard for the monastic life as did Plotinus.

⁴⁰ See *Enneads*, I, i, 10; I, viii, 4, 9-10; II, iii, 8; III, vi, 5; V, iii, 7.

envisions it.⁴¹ Although Coleridge liked to remember that, "from [his] very childhood," he was "accustomed . . . by a sort of transference and transmission of [his] consciousness to identify [himself] with the Object," there is no indication in the juvenilia that he ever achieved the kind of identification which Plotinus regarded as ultimate. "To the Evening Star" appears to have mystical overtones until it is placed in its Plotinian context, when the mysticism becomes simply contemplation. Beginning with a tribute to the "chaste effulgent glow" of the star, Coleridge continues:

On thee full oft with fixéd eye I gaze
 Till I, methinks, all spirit seem to grow.
 O first and fairest of the starry choir,
 O loveliest 'mid the daughters of the night,
 Must not the maid I love like thee inspire
Pure joy and calm Delight?

Must she not be, as is thy placid sphere
 Serenely brilliant? Whilst to gaze a while
 Be all my wish 'mid Fancy's high career
 E'en till she quit this scene of earthly toil;
 Then Hope perchance might fondly sigh to join
 Her spirit in thy kindred orb, O Star benign!

So far as Plotinus is concerned, the point of departure for the mystical experience is the soul's contemplation of its own activities, not its delight in nature. But Coleridge's point of departure is a delight in nature; and, although the line, "Till I, methinks, all spirit seem to grow," suggests a possible identification with the world soul, it is clear from the rest of the poem that no such suggestion is intended.

"To the Evening Star" is thoroughly Plotinian in its conceptual background. Even the description of the star is borrowed from the *Enneads*. According to Plotinus, planets are all "chaste" and "serene," they all move in a "placid sphere," and they all inspire "*Pure joy and calm Delight*" because their souls are the purest of all souls below the level of pure intellect. Unlike the souls of men, which are made turbulent by passions and appetites, plane-

⁴¹ See *Enneads*, I, vi, 9; IV, iv, 25; V, iii, 8-9; V, v, 6-8; VI, vii, 35-36; VI, ix, 11.

tary souls exist in a blissful state of transcendence and immunity to all things physical. With nothing to disturb their perfect serenity, they move eternally in a circle about God, to whom they cling in love. Human souls are fallen planetary souls, and they will be rewarded, when reward is due, by being restored to the planetary sphere.⁴² It is evident from the sestet of the sonnet that Coleridge is thinking of the "Evening Star" in precisely such terms. So virtuous is "the maid" he loves, Coleridge is saying, that, when her soul quits "this scene of earthly toil," it must certainly become a planetary soul. Perhaps then he will wish to join the planetary sphere also, but for the present he is content "to gaze" on it "a while" with no immediate desire to become a part of it. Insofar as this whimsically pleasant little compliment involves reflection on the destiny of the soul, it is contemplation in the Plotinian sense, which of course implies that the contemplator will "all spirit seem to grow." But in no sense does it involve a sudden dazzling vision of The One. In fact, in another poem, which is called simply "Life," Coleridge suggests that such a vision is impossible so long as the soul remains bound to a body:

May this (I cried) my course through Life portray!
 New scenes of Wisdom may each step display,
 And knowledge open as my days advance!
 Till when death pours at length the undarkened ray,
 My eye shall dart thro' infinite expanse,
 While thought suspended lies in Transport's blissful trance.⁴³

Coleridge's statement that the "rage for metaphysics" came to an abrupt conclusion in his "seventeenth year" is puzzling. He may have meant that he discontinued his research at this time, but he could not have meant that he lost interest in the problem. There is admittedly a crisis in his thinking in late 1789, but the crisis is followed only by a more intense "pursuit," and it is only in this later "pursuit" that he shows evidence of originality. Although the "investigations" are characterized by increasing de-

⁴² See *Enneads*, II, i, 4-5; II, ii, 2; II, ix, 8; III, iv, 6; IV, iii, 15, 17; IV, viii, 2; V, i, 2.

⁴³ I am quoting from the early version of this poem, since the meaning of the lines is clearer than it is in the revised version.

spair, he emerges from them as a thinker of independent and even significant stature.

The crisis is introduced by Coleridge's admission that in two years he has made no progress whatever in the direction of virtue. In a fit of remorse he wishes for the return of those "ill-past hours," which he would now, he thinks, devote to contemplation:

No more, as then, should Sloth around me throw
 Her soul-enslaving, leaden chain!
 No more the precious time would I employ
 In giddy revels, or in thoughtless joy,
 A present joy producing future woe.

According to Plotinus, virtue is activity, and activity is the characteristic and peculiar function of the soul. Vice is the curtailment of that activity through the encroachment of matter, which is itself inactive. Hence for Plotinus the term *sloth* is synonymous with the terms *matter* and *the world*.⁴⁴ But, although the line, "Her soul-enslaving, leaden chain," indicates that Coleridge is thinking in Plotinian terms, he seems to mean by "Sloth," not merely an encroachment of matter on the soul, but a prior weakness of will which makes such encroachment possible. That this meaning is intended is evident from the conclusion of the poem:

'Tis vain to wish, for Time has ta'en his flight —
 For follies past be ceas'd the fruitless tears:
 Let follies past to future care incite.
 Averse maturer judgements to obey
 Youth owns, with pleasure owns, the Passions' sway,
 But sage Experience only comes with years.⁴⁵

For Plotinus, of course, the years do not bring "maturer judgements" and "sage Experience": they bring only vicious habits, against which the soul is powerless to struggle. The fallen soul must therefore turn back at once, or it is lost. But the soul will not turn back, Coleridge maintains, until it has learned for itself the whole awful cost of its folly.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ See Enneads, I, viii, 4; IV, viii, 2; IV, ix, 2; V, ix, 1.

⁴⁵ "Quae Nocent Docent," lines 1-6, 13-18.

⁴⁶ I am omitting mention of two poems which are commonly assigned to this period, "Anthem for the Children of Christ's Hospital" and "Destruction of the Bastille," since, on the basis of content, it is unthinkable that either poem could

Coleridge's conclusion is emotional rather than rational, and, in fact, the whole poem is a confession rather than a philosophical pronouncement. The fact remains that Coleridge was finding the Enneads inadequate in one very essential respect. That vice is the cause of human suffering and that vice is sloth in the Plotinian sense, Coleridge did not doubt. Neither did he doubt that virtue is the activity of a free soul, which, having disciplined itself by reasoning about the "soul-enslaving, leaden chain," has broken the chain and so risen to the higher level of reflections on its own acts. But to undertake the discipline requires an act of will, and of this act of will Coleridge, at least, was incapable. Hence, although he had previously accepted freedom as a fact, he was now compelled to face it as a problem. For Coleridge no problem was academic, but it is evident from the sonnet, "Pain," that this problem had a special urgency, for the "Sickness & other & worse afflictions" which had prompted the "investigations" in the first place were now becoming a torment. An inquiry into the whole moral nature of man with special reference to the dual question of why man should fall from innocence in the first place and why, having fallen, he should be reluctant to turn back was therefore imperative. The inquiry would, of course, be conducted within the framework of the Enneads, but Coleridge would supplement and amend Plotinus's conclusions with his own psychological insights, derived from three years of introspective analysis.

"Progress of Vice," the first of the "metaphysical" writings of 1790-91, is an elaboration of several passages in the Enneads. Plotinus had already pointed out that the fall is involuntary and gradual; he had also pointed out that the soul learns of its original innocence only after it is lost and serenity is replaced by

have been written in 1789. I have shown elsewhere that the "Anthem" could not have been written prior to mid-1790 and that it was probably written in 1791. See "Coleridge's 'Anthem': Another Debt to Bowles," *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, LVIII (1959), 270-275. "Destruction of the Bastille" clearly belongs to the Hartleyan period. The social indignation expressed in this poem is irreconcilable with the whole Neoplatonic group. Plotinus himself steadily advised stoic resignation on the ground that the only real defense against human iniquity is virtue, the virtuous alone being unaffected by it (see Enneads, I, iv, 11; III, ii, 8-9; III, viii, 4), and Coleridge at this time certainly agreed with him. Moreover, the "Freedom" hailed in this poem is merely civil liberty; the only freedom which interested the Coleridge of 1789 was moral freedom.

turbulence.⁴⁷ Although Coleridge's version is to a large extent a simple dramatization of these passages, it adds something to them, chiefly the rôle played by "Shame" or guilt, which appears first as the defender of virtue, later as the pander of vice. No one, Coleridge begins, deliberately leaps from innocence into "the gulph of Vice and Woe": everyone slips into the void gradually and unconsciously, lured there, in fact, by his very innocence. But, having fallen, he is aware of his plight, for memory acquaints him with the serenity he has lost and imagination with the sufferings which lie ahead. At once "Shame," the "guard" of "inborn Truth and Virtue," urges him to turn back, but

the Voice, the Lyre, their charms combine —
Gay sparkles in the cup the generous Wine —
Th' inebriate dance, the fair frail Nymph inspires,
And Virtue vanquish'd — scorn'd — with hasty flight retires.

After a while the pleasures lose their seductiveness, but the victim is urged on by his own restlessness, by a torment of guilt, which gives him no peace. With full knowledge of the consequences of his conduct, he therefore plunges on to his ruin. Or, in Coleridge's words:

But soon to tempt the Pleasures cease;
Yet Shame forbids return to peace,
And stern Necessity will force
Still to urge on the desperate course.

The poem, "Honour," restates the thesis that the habitually vicious act, not from any expectation of pleasure, but from a necessity growing out of their own restlessness. Thus Philedon concludes the story of his downfall by cursing "Experience that he makes me wise" and so dispels "the dear deliriums":

A hideous hag th' Enchantress Pleasure seems,
And all her joys appear but feverous dreams.
The vain resolve still broken and still made,
Disease and loathing and remorse invade;
The charm is vanish'd and the bubble's broke, —
A slave to pleasure is a slave to smoke! ⁴⁸

⁴⁷ See *Enneads*, I, viii, 11; III, ii, 4-5; IV, viii, 7.

⁴⁸ Lines 56-57, 59-64.

In two essays,⁴⁹ one composed in September, 1790, the other in January, 1791, Coleridge deals more specifically with the question of freedom. The essays begin with an elaboration of the Plotinian thesis that the fall itself is an involuntary act. According to Plotinus, an act is voluntary only when it is performed without external compulsion and in full knowledge of its character and consequences; the fall is involuntary because it inevitably results from the soul's commerce with the world and because the agent is inevitably precluded by its very purity from any knowledge of the character and consequences of its act.⁵⁰ Although Coleridge puts this somewhat differently, the tenor of his remarks is the same. Strictly speaking, he says, no one is responsible for the fall, or, at least, our "first deviations from the paths of rectitude the natural imbecillity [sic] of human nature may excuse. In the beginning of Life Error and Folly wear their most alluring dress. They have then all the charms of novelty to recommend them, and the inexperience, credulity, and rashness of the youthful mind to combat on their side. That they too often obtain the conquest therefore produces rather Pity, than wonder, in the candid mind. Nor to any, but a malignant eye can the follies of Youth cast a shade over the virtues of a maturer age, nor will the retrospect excite a painful blush." If there is any freedom, therefore, it postdates the fall.

Plotinus was uncertain as to whether there was such freedom or not. He argued on the one hand that, prior to the time that vice becomes habitual, the soul should be able to turn back, since it now possesses knowledge both of the serenity it has forfeited and of the consequences of iniquity. On the other hand he admitted that men are by no means equal: some seem always to be governed by the principle of freedom, and some seem to be governed from the outset by a self-will, which, having its origin in matter, acts in stubborn and compulsive opposition to the principle. In the main he preferred to dodge the question by referring to souls as either "strong" or "weak."⁵¹ Coleridge's account parallels

⁴⁹ For these essays, see Lawrence Hanson, *The Life of S. T. Coleridge* (London, 1938), pp. 424-426.

⁵⁰ See *Enneads*, II, iii, 8; IV, viii, 5; VI, viii, 1.

⁵¹ See *Enneads*, I, viii, 5; III, ii, 4-5; III, iii, 4; IV, iii, 16; IV, viii, 5-7; V, i, 1; V, ix, 1.

Plotinus's, but, again, it is colored and supplemented by his own experience. Although to "err," Coleridge begins, "may be a debt to humanity, . . . to persevere in Error marks the weak and depraved mind." "No plea now remains to excuse our continuance in a state, from which Experience, Reason and Shame conspire to rouse us": "Reason should now have dissipated the mists of passion, and Experience must have removed the specious veil, which once concealed the deformities and effects of Folly." We should now be aware of our duty to family and society, a consideration which Plotinus overlooked, and we must realize that the pleasures which we anticipated are chimeras. Coleridge goes on to repeat what he has already said in "Progress of Vice"; but, whereas he previously indicated that pleasures lose their seductiveness only when we begin to weary of them, he now suggests that pleasure is always a will-o'-the-wisp. Only the truly innocent who are as yet unacquainted with "Reason and Shame," can regard pleasure as attainable, he argues. But, once we attempt to realize "the delightful vision," we are no longer innocent, and so we realize instead only "darkness and haunts obscene and frightful, with all the gloomy offspring of a diseased fancy." With our first misstep, therefore, "the very pleasures, which influenced us, are fled!" If, under these circumstances, we choose to "sacrifice all that is truly advantageous and honourable in life" not to a selfish, but to a purely "unselfish" pursuit of pleasure, we must have "a disposition so congenial with Vice, that well may the conduct, which was pitied in Youth, now be punished by the neglect and contempt of others, and by the remorse of our own breasts." The first essay concludes, therefore, with the suggestion that there is a principle of freedom and that most men can be counted on to act in accordance with it.

This suggestion is modified in the second essay, when Coleridge attempts to account for the fact of human "weakness." Although again his argument falls within the general framework of the *Enneads*, the psychological insight is entirely his own. The essay begins by limiting the possibility of freedom to the period after the fall and before "the perpetration of those actions, in which the Vice is collected into one atrocious crime," for, "Alas!" Coleridge observes, "at the moment we contract a habit we forego our

free agency. The remainder of our life will be spent in making resolutions in the hour of dejection and breaking them in the hour of Passion. As if we were in some great sea-vortex, every moment we perceive our ruin more clearly, every moment we are impelled towards it with greater force." But, even before we "contract a habit," he goes on, "we exhibit the most striking picture of our weakness in . . . distempered reasonings. . . . The superior enjoyments, which criminal pursuits promise, seem to us then to form the only difference between Virtue and Vice. We contemptuously compare the calm happiness of the one with the keen delights of the other. We call Temperance and Sobriety joyless severity, and think, that we should have reason to congratulate ourselves on exchanging Thorns for Flowers." How is one to account for these "distempered reasonings"? The implication is that "weakness" is simply inherent in the character of most individuals; or, as Coleridge put it in the poem, "On Imitation":

All are not born to soar — and ah! how few
In tracks where Wisdom leads their paths pursue!

In the course of his discussion, Coleridge returns to the question of pleasure. Repudiating his previous suggestion that "the delightful vision" can never be actualized, he now indicates that it can be, but that it will be followed by an equal degree of pain. We may be certain, he promises, that "we shall find the loose hour punished by still-attendant disgust and self-reproach. We shall find, that as high as the Spirits are artificially raised above their natural standards, so far they must sink below it." We must therefore ask ourselves, "Will the pleasures of riotous mirth compensate for the despondency, which follows it?" Plotinus had already said that men are punished for their aberrations in strict accordance with cosmic law,⁵² but Coleridge seems to suggest that the cosmic law is after all only Newton's third law of motion, which, in its application to mind, demands that for every pleasure there will be an equal and opposite pain.

Far more interesting, however, is the sharply autobiographical passage which follows. Referring again to the "despondency" which invariably follows "riotous mirth," Coleridge warns that a

⁵² See *Enneads*, III, ii, 4-5; IV, iii, 16, 24; IV, iv, 45.

"despondency, which is able to create imaginary misfortunes," can be counted on to "aggravate great and real evils" later. "Then," he continues, "the Debt and Embarrassments, which our irregularities have brought upon us, will torture our minds with double suspense and dread. Then shall the remembrance of our loss of Health be most painful. Then shall we sigh more deeply for that perpetual sunshine of the breast, which Virtue and Temperance impart. Then shall we look back with keenest remorse to those happy times, when we knew and feared no harm." Although this passage seems to be Plotinian, it lays the groundwork for a serious deviation from Plotinus. According to the *Enneads*, the soul is punished for its first irregularity by "turbulence," but, since through "turbulence" it learns the meaning and value of serenity, the punishment is remedial, the soul being thereby encouraged to turn back. But Coleridge doubts that the punishment is remedial. On the basis of his own experience, he finds that the effect of "turbulence" is to goad the soul on to its ruin. Tormented by a "diseased fancy" and crazed by "distempered reasonings," it plunges on into vice in a desperate effort to escape its own misery. Meanwhile the memory of its original innocence, which, according to Plotinus, is most vivid immediately following the fall, is, according to Coleridge, not vivid until considerably later, by which time the soul is too deep in "the gulph of Vice and Woe" to extricate itself. For Coleridge, therefore, the memory is less a force impelling it toward virtue than a consolation for vice. This fact is particularly evident in the last lines of "Absence," even though Coleridge makes his point analogically. The beginning of the poem, which I have quoted in another context, is Coleridge's lament for his own lost innocence:

Ah me! too mindful of the days
Illumed by Passion's orient rays,
When Peace, and Cheerfulness and Health
Enriched me with the best of wealth.
Ah fair Delights! that o'er my soul
On Memory's wing, like shadows fly!
Ah Flowers! which Joy from Eden stole
While Innocence stood smiling by! —

But cease, fond Heart! this bootless moan:
Those Hours on rapid Pinions flown
Shall yet return, by Absence crown'd,
And scatter livelier roses round.
The Sun who ne'er remits his fires
On heedless eyes may pour the day:
The Moon, that oft from Heaven retires,
Endears her renovated ray.
What though she leave the sky unblest
To mourn awhile in murky vest?
When she relumes her lovely light,
We bless the Wanderer of the Night.

So ends the "rage for metaphysics." After four years of "investigations," Coleridge has been able only to state in another context what "Cato" had already said, namely, that the reason loses its integrity as a result of the fall and becomes a mere tool of the passions. In fact, Coleridge has gone farther than "Cato" in denying man's moral responsibility, for he has added to the "distempered reasonings" a "diseased fancy" and a cruel memory which functions only when it is too late. His final observation,

Yet see, how high and low, and young and old
Pursue the all-delusive power of Gold,⁵³

is therefore little more than a versification of "Cato's" sentiment: "To get money out of other People's Pockets, and put it in their own" is "the grand Design and Business of all Mankind, the chief if not the only Spring of all their Actions, and animates and inspires their best as well as worst Performances."⁵⁴ But Coleridge is still not ready to accept the implications of his conclusions, for which reason the "rage" is succeeded, not by a return to "Cato," but by a kind of Christian resignation. For example, in one of the two last poems which belong to this period, "Reason," which has had so much to say to youth before, now has only one piece of advice:

⁵³ "Honour," lines 13-14.

⁵⁴ Cato's Letters, III, 145.

For humble independence pray:
 The guardian genius of thy way;⁵⁵
 Whom (sages say) in days of yore
 Meek Competence to Wisdom bore,
 So shall thy little vessel glide
 With a fair breeze adown the tide,
 And Hope, if e'er thou 'ginst to sorrow,
 Remind thee of some fair to-morrow,
 Till Death shall close thy tranquil eye
 While Faith proclaims 'Thou shalt not die!' ⁵⁶

In the other poem, "Anthem for the Children of Christ's Hospital," the god whom Coleridge praises is not Plotinus's god of indifference or "Cato's" god of wholly otherness, but a universal father who is consumed with pity for his creatures. The creatures, too, are not the self-sufficient rationalists of the *Enneads*, and neither are they the crafty wretches of the Letters: they are simply children, weak and desperately in need of help.

Coleridge had not, however, accepted Christianity, and he would not accept it until he had conducted many more "investigations." Resignation was to give way to Hartleianism, after which he would resume the "investigations" with greater intensity. What had Coleridge learned from them thus far? Basically and most important, he had learned that "in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance," lies the key to all truth about man, the world, and God and that everyone may know the truth through a thoughtful watchfulness of the life within himself. From observations of the activity of his own mind, Coleridge had reached certain specific conclusions: first, that, in the course of his lifetime, every man must fall from a state of innocence into a state of sin, a fall being the inevitable result of the soul's commerce with the world; second, that he becomes aware of the fall only after it has occurred and he experiences for the first time the turbulence of guilt; third, that he is goaded into further vices, not by an expectation of pleasure, but by the torment of his own wretchedness; fourth,

⁵⁵ This is evidently Plotinus's "tutelary spirit" (see *Enneads*, III, iv, 3-6; VI, vii, 25).

⁵⁶ "Happiness," lines 96-105.

that virtue begins with reflection and that most men are incapable of virtue because most men are averse to thought; fifth, that, if there is any freedom, it is limited to the period after the fall and before vice becomes habitual; sixth, that the memory of lost innocence is a consolation for the loss and a promise of the ultimate destiny of the soul, but in no sense a remedy; and, finally, that, although everyone is subject to calamities, only the vicious suffer because of them. In the main, Coleridge would not question any of these conclusions, but he needed assistance to incorporate them into a comprehensive theology. He found that assistance in the writings of Bishop Berkeley and Edmund Burke.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ For a consideration of the rôle played by these two men in the formulation of Coleridge's mature theology, see Werkmeister, "Coleridge on Science, Philosophy, and Poetry: Their Relation to Religion," *Harvard Theological Review*, LII (1959), 85-118.

THE STRANGE UNIVERSE OF JONATHAN EDWARDS *

SOMEBODY has said that Mencius, though he lived almost twenty-five centuries ago and belonged to an alien culture, is more intelligible to us today than our own Jonathan Edwards of Connecticut. There is some truth in this remark.

To recapture Edwards' point of view requires a very definite effort. For old fashioned Fundamentalists, like Southern Baptists, or for members of the so-called "fringe" denominations, like the Witnesses of Jehovah, the effort does not have to be quite so great, because these people also take the Bible literally, and are equally exclusive in whom they admit to Salvation. But for the liberal Protestant of today, or even for the Catholic, Edwards seems remarkably foreign and remote.

To seize again after two centuries the meaning of his thought one must grasp first of all that for him traditional Christian dogma is uniquely true. The comparative view-point has watered down our convictions to the extent that the utmost we can admit is that Christian dogma *may*, or *can*, be true, as one logical possibility among several alternatives. There is, of course, no need to say that this relativism would have left Edwards cold.

Another point where the half dozen generations separating us from Edwards has left little if any sympathetic understanding is his conviction of the reality of the evilness of sin. For him the evilness of sin is concretely real in the same cosmic sense as the iron clad laws of a former generation of physicists were real. There is no need to emphasize the vast difference here between this interpretation of the evilness of sin and that of modern Christians who reduce the whole matter to mundane sociology.

This conviction of Edwards is a special case under his more general conviction that all ethical concepts represent fundamental realities. Thus, the goodness of virtue is real, the beauty of the Holiness of God, of Saints, of the Angels who remained loyal to God, is real, justice as a precise apportionment of pain to guilt is real. These entities and many

* References are to: The Works of President Edwards . . . in Ten Volumes. Volumes 2 and 7 have imprint: New York, S. Converse, 1829; volume 8 has same imprint except that date is 1830. The remaining volumes have imprint: New York, G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1830. It is a pity to have to give references to an edition accessible with difficulty (it happens to be in the author's library). However, until the new edition being compiled at Yale is available, the volumes cited here are no harder to find than any others.

others like them are real not in the restricted sociological sense according to which their reality does not extend beyond a particular mortal social group at a particular period of time, on a tiny planet. They are real in the overwhelming sense of reality that we in the present age reserve for tremendous beings like the Nebula of Andromeda, or like the energy released by cosmic explosions such as novae. Their reality, in other words, is literally cosmic, which means that they are the warp and woof of the universe and are eternal. Indeed, the reality of the physical universe with its space and time and natural laws is secondary to them.

Even if we of today thought that the attribution of such immense reality to ethical concepts were not overly romantic, and that morals might, in fact, have some basis deeper than sociological expediency, we should draw the line at the apotheosis of justice in the judicial sense¹ indicated above. The notion of just punishment as virtuously inflicted pain has gone by. This is the reason why we no longer use judicial torture. The notion of an officially constituted judge, a Jeffreys, even in this mundane world, ordering torture out of sheer fury is too outlandish to be tolerated. But all of this modern thought would have struck Edwards as un-Scriptural, and as evidence of the truth of the dogma of the Total Depravity of the Natural Man, and even as unscientific.

There is, indeed, a cold, impartial, scientific objectivity² about Edwards' apotheosis of justice. The moral collapse of the race, which started with Adam's and Eve's disobedience, is a given fact — a datum, we should say today, the sort of thing the scientist accepts without argument. An evil man or woman or child is simply a given instance of pollution. There is no question of free will in the metaphysical sense Kant was later to explain, or in the modern sociological sense bound up with civil rights, democratic liberty, rugged individualism, etc. The sole point is that in the eyes of an impartial judge, incapable of erring in the law, the wicked person's punishment is obligatory and desirable, and, furthermore, simply *is*, as a scientific datum.

Where Edwards is most unintelligible to the modern Christian is in his descriptions of the sufferings of the damned.³ There is, no doubt, a grim literary talent exhibited in these passages. But Edwards was not a Dante. That is, he did not conceive of himself as just telling a story with undercurrents of symbolic truth. No, he thought that he was

¹ Vol. 5. "Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners," pp. 498 ff.

" 7. "Miscellaneous Remarks," chapter 6, pp. 505 ff.

² Vol. 2. "Original Sin," cf. section 9, pp. 378 ff. and p. 547. Also see Perry Miller's Jonathan Edwards, William Sloane Associates, 1949, in "The American Men of Letters Series," 71 ff., 192, 225, 267 ff.

³ Vol. 7. "Miscellaneous Remarks," chapter 2, pp. 347 ff.

telling the literal truth, derived from analysis of Scriptural statements. Unfortunately, indeed, Edwards is likely to make some of us, who are not historical-minded, feel that he was neurotic by his ghastly insistence, for instance, that on the Judgment Day God will resurrect, for the unelect, especially contrived bodies which will enable them to experience the torture of hell forever without their lapsing into merciful unconsciousness for the least fraction of a second.⁴ The suffering of the damned is not physical only, for they are suffering *now*, before God has joined their bodies to them. They suffer, for example, from being hated by everybody:⁵ by God, by the devil, by the other damned souls, by the elect, by the angels and demons, etc. The state of being friendless must have appeared dreadful to Edwards, as his description is poignant.

Edwards builds up the quite detailed picture of a cosmos which is what one might call for want of a better word cosmo-sociological.⁶ The real beings are God, the devil, angels, demons, and souls of human beings, and psychical entities such as emotions and sensations. The real laws are the moral laws governing them. The real order is the hierarchy of their social positions. His universe is to a surprising extent, in the mind of an Eighteenth Century American, a reflection of the one-time feudalistic structure of Europe. His emphasis on the manhood of Jesus Christ is from a rather unusual angle. In his writings is the idea that after the Ascension, the Logos remained, and will continue to remain forever, joined to a man's body, Head of the created universe.⁷ The category of manhood, thus, becomes another of those fundamental ontological realities like good and evil.

Edwards transferred the legal and moral categories of life in earthly society to the level of the cosmical or metaphysical order. If modern science reads technology and mathematics into the universe, Edwards read a kind of glorified sociology, though the sociology looks harsh and sovereign-ridden to us of today with our democratic predilections. For him man is the end of all things:⁸ the animal and vegetable worlds and the astronomical cosmos. When these things, in due time, cease to be, their momentary existence will have been justified because they will have fulfilled their purpose in their relation to man, who is eternal,

⁴ Vol. 3. "History of Redemption," p. 416.

⁵ Vol. 8. Sermon I, pp. 16 ff.

⁶ Vol. 3. "Nature of True Virtue," p. 114.

" 7. "Miscellaneous Observations," chapter 7, pp. 277 ff.

" 8. Ibid., descriptions of life in Heaven, pp. 526 ff.

" 7. "Miscellaneous Remarks," chapter 6, pp. 520 ff.

⁷ Vol. 8. "Miscellaneous Observations," pp. 505 ff.

⁸ Vol. 3. "End for which God Created the World," pp. 85 ff.

" 7. "Miscellaneous Remarks," chapter 1, pp. 360 ff.

though, unfortunately, in the majority of cases eternal in hell. Man, himself, however, exists only for the Glory of God.

Edwards' strange universe received an important part of its structure while he was young and had not yet confined his attention to Biblical studies and Calvinistic theology. He evolved, perhaps independently, a system of metaphysical idealism⁹ similar to that of George Berkeley, the Irish Episcopalian bishop, and of Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, another Episcopalian. Thus, if he retained this line of thought into his later years, which he probably did, it would have been easy for him to have given his cosmo-sociological order a reality deeper than that of the physical universe, since the latter would have been merely a series of sensations in the minds of spirits.

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⁹ Vol. 1. Appendix, "The Mind," pp. 664 ff.

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